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The PRC is a multi-ethnic country comprising the Han majority group and 55 
other ethnic minorities. Since many of the minorities are populated in strategically 
important peripheral areas, how to integrate these ethnic groups and frontier regions 
into China Proper has been a critical issue in China’s state-building process. 
Despite the serious efforts made by the CCP in its state-building project, the 
1990s has seen a growing ethno-nationalism countrywide. One of the most extreme 
cases is the Uyghur’s East Turkestan movement, which, after remaining silent in the 
whole decade of the 1970s, resurfaced from 1980, and became active since the 1990s. 
What accounts for this surge of ethno-nationalism, especially Uyghur activism? 
Viewing the state as a part of society, this paper attempts to explore the 
dynamics between state-building and ethno-nationalism in China. It argues that state-
building, which intends to assure and expand its power, provides opportunity for 
ethno-nationalism to grow, and even more, for ethnic political movements to occur. 
By tracing the processes and dynamics as to how the shift in the state policy affects 
the cognitive framework of the minority people, provides sustainable resource to the 
movement, and offers space for social movement organizations to surface, this paper 
will then illustrate how state-building produces some unintended results. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
The issue of ethno-nationalism continues to be given increasing attention in 
scholarship because of the rise of ethnic political movements in many regions of the 
world. This is also true of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which claims to be 
a unitary multi-national state. According to the fifth national census taken in 2000, 
the Han people made up 91.59% of the country's total population, while the minority 
groups comprise 8.41%. Although the minority groups constitute slightly over 8% of 
the population, they inhabit over two thirds of China’s territory, and their population 
is almost 100 million, nearly 40 % that of U.S.1 Furthermore, many of these ethnic 
groups are situated in the frontier regions of China. 
How to govern the ethnic minorities and the frontier regions has been a vital 
political issue under the political agenda of state building in China. The fundamental 
policy adopted by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) towards the minorities is the 
Minority Region Autonomy Policy (minzu quyu zizhi zhidu). By establishing minority 
autonomous governments in the residence of the minority groups, the CCP claims to 
grant the ethnic minorities the right to deal with their own affairs.  
                                                 
1 State Statistics Bureau of P. R. China ed., Statistics Yearbook of China 2003, (Beijing: China 
Statistics Press, 2003), p.11. 
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Moreover, the Chinese government has devised quite a number of preferential 
policies that grant privileges to the minorities in a number of areas ranging from 
politics to education. To integrate the ethnic minorities into the state, the CCP also 
tries to create an image of a unified nation since ancient times by selectively 
manipulating the historical experiences and memories. China is depicted as a ‘melting 
pot’, in which many ethnic groups live in harmony and the ethnic boundaries 
naturally disappear. The ‘sinicization scenario’ is predicted by both modernization 
and Marxist theories of nationalism. 
However, the 1990s witnessed a surge of ethno-nationalism in some places of 
China, especially Xinjiang.2 The minority groups employed various means to express 
their heightened sense of ethnic identity. A good example was the sudden increase in 
the minority population, which did not result from improving fertility, but from the 
willingness of a lot of minority people to claim their real ethnic identity.3 
The Uyghur ethnic community in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 
(XUAR) offers a relevant case of rising ethno-nationalism. 4  Not confining their 
nationalism to just claiming their ethnic distinction, the Uyghur people re-initiated 
                                                 
2 Dru C. Gladney, Muslim Chinese: Ethnic Nationalism in the People’s Republic (Harvard University 
Press: 1991), p.1. 
3 Matthew Hoddie, ‘Ethnic Identity Change in the People’s Republic of China: An Explanation Using 
Data from the 1982 and 1990 Census Enumerations’, in Nationalism and Ethnoregional Identities in 
China, William Safran ed. (Frank Cass: 1998), pp.119-141. 
4 Also could be called Uighur or Ugyur. 
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their East Turkestan independence movement with the aim to establish their own state. 
From 1980s, social disturbances such as demonstrations, marches and clashes by the 
Uyghurs occurred in this northwestern region from time to time. The Uyghur activism 
escalated in the 1990s. Xinjiang has been haunted with quite a number of riots, 
insurgencies, demonstrations and even terrorist activities. The two most widely 
known incidents are the uprising in Baren Township, Akto County in Xinjiang and a 
separatist rioting in Yining, in 1990 and 1997 respectively. The degree of violence 
was unusually high. The persistence of the Uyghur activism has not only unnerved 
the Chinese authorities, but also caught the attention of the international community. 
1.1Research Questions 
What accounts for the rising ethno-nationalism in China, especially the Uyghur 
activism? What causes the proliferation of such collective challenges by the Uyghur 
people? These are the twin research questions I want to address in this study. These 
‘social disturbances’ of the modern Chinese world requires a radical reassessment of 
the former thinking about the assimilation and marginalization of minorities in China. 
In accounting for the ethno-nationalism, one would want to mention a number of 
factors covering historical memories as well as realistic reasons. However, the main 
concern of this paper is to explore the reasons as to why an upsurge of the Uyghur 
activism occurred in 1980s and 1990s after an apparent quiescence of the group in the 
1970s.  In other words, the focus of the study is to analyze the factors and conditions 
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that made Uyghurs more virulent in their protests against the rule by the Chinese 
government, instead of the formation of the ethno-nationalism. 
By tracing the process of state building and the rationale behind it, this study 
will explore the dynamics between the integration by the state and the re-emergence 
and development of this social movement. Ethno-nationalism, with its potential 
centrifugal force, has always been cautioned by the CCP. State building, which aims 
to maintain and expand the power of the state, has to device some effective strategies 
to accommodate these ethno-national feelings. It can be logically deduced that state 
building would tend to discourage subversive social disturbances rather than 
encourage ethnic unrest.  For a better understanding of the correlation between state 
building and social movement, it is necessary to address three sub-questions. First is 
the development of the ethnic social movement, in this case the East Turkestan 
Independence Movement. Before pursuing the factors influencing the social 
movement, I will first examine the development pattern of the movement. Second is 
the process of state building. Since political scientists have differing views on state 
building, the assumption about the nature of state and state building that I subscribe to, 
should be discussed first to avoid any theoretical ambiguities that might occur in the 
later analysis. I prefer a more dynamic perspective on state and state building, which 
will be illustrated in the corresponding chapter. On one hand, there should be a 
certain rationale behind every step in state building project although some strategies 
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might not be rational when viewed afterward. To have a better understanding of state 
building, we should know the considerations of the state behind each policy shift. On 
the other hand, during the dynamic process of interaction of various social forces, the 
state could not completely penetrate the society at its will. The social changes brought 
by state building might unintentionally arouse some ethnic tensions and render the 
established political order more vulnerable to challenge. The last sub-question that I 
hope to pose is the causal mechanism between state building and social movement. 
Consideration of a time sequence alone is less useful to demonstrate a causal 
relationship. How state building forms an important factor in triggering and fueling 
social movement needs more elaborations.  
1.2The significance of this study 
This research can be placed within a theoretical framework. Firstly, this study is 
an effort to explore the issue of ethno-nationalism in China. Ethno-nationalism is a 
form of political consciousness along lines of nationality. The emergence and rise of 
national consciousness is of a relatively recent origin. As Ernest Barker noted ‘the 
self-consciousness of nations is a product of the nineteenth century. This is a matter 
of the first importance. Nations were already there; they had indeed been there for 
centuries… What really and finally matters is the thing which is apprehended as an 
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idea, and, as an idea, is vested with emotion until it becomes a cause and a spring of 
action.’5 Ethno-nationalism, in essence, is a psychological feeling of belonging to a 
certain group, an awareness of ethnic identity. A central debate in the literature of 
identity focuses on the degree to which the ethnic identity is malleable. Proponents of 
the ‘primordialist’ perspective maintain that ethnic identity is fixed and unchangeable. 
In contrast, ‘instrumentalists’ hold the opinion that ethnic identity can be manipulated 
by the elites in an effort to mobilize support for their interests. To them, ethno-
nationalism could be used as a weapon in the pursuit of collective advantages. The 
evidence presented in my study strongly favors the latter view. Besides the nature of 
ethno-nationalism, the process in which the ethno-nationalistic feelings and 
sentiments convert to action has been far from fully explored. My study, hopefully, 
can contribute to a fuller understanding of the emergence and development of ethno-
nationalism by examining the ebb and flow of the Uyghur’s political movement. 
Secondly, my study hopes to enhance our understanding of state building and 
integration. State building is of great importance for modern countries to assure and 
expand their power. For multi-ethnic states, one major task of state building is 
integration: to integrate the various ethnic groups into the state. The term integration 
is widely used in the study of ethnic groups and its equivalent in Chinese is Zhenghe 
                                                 
5 Ernest Barker, National Character and the Factors in its Formation (London, 1927), p.173. 
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(literally means ‘to come together as a whole’). As a part of state building, integration 
per se is a dynamic process. Due to the fluidity and manipulability of ethno-
nationalism, the construction of ethno-nationalism becomes a battlefield in which 
various social forces struggle for domination. In this sense, integration could be 
regarded as a battle initiated by the state with the aim to construct a unified image of 
a nation and gain legitimacy. Because of the interaction of various social forces, the 
process of integration is full of negotiation and conflict, fusion and fission. The result 
may be unexpected and unanticipated. Though the view of integration as a process 
becomes more popular in recent scholarly analyses, most of these works have focused 
heavily on European, American, and African countries. The study on dynamics 
between state building and ethno-nationalism in China remains a barren soil. This 
might be due to two tendencies. First, most western political scientists tend to 
overemphasize the development of China from a large empire to a unified nation, thus 
neglecting the ethnic dimensions in China. Some political scholars have portrayed a 
high degree of ethnic homogeneity—such as Eric Hobsbawn’s declaration that 
‘China… [is] indeed among the extremely rare examples of historic states composed 
of a population that is ethnically almost or entirely homogeneous.’6 However, the fact 
that China has accommodated 56 ethnic groups has made it difficult to think of this 
                                                 
6 Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), p.66. 
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country in ethnically monochromatic terms. Second, many scholars have strong belief 
in the overwhelming power of authoritarian states such as China to penetrate the 
society. Nonetheless, the Chinese government experienced and is experiencing 
decentralization transformation. 7  Local forces are gaining more leverage in 
bargaining with the central government. The diversity and rigor between various 
ethnic groups and the central government merit our careful examination. Thus, my 
study, it is hoped, would help broaden the understanding of state building and 
integration in China. 
Besides attempting to contribute to theoretical study, this article also wants to 
aid the efforts to achieve a better understanding of the Xinjiang problem in China. 
First, the importance of Xinjiang should be noted. As the largest province in China, 
Xinjiang accommodates various minority groups including Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Hui, 
Dungans, Kirghiz, Mongols, Russians, Manchus, Tajiks and Taranchi. It occupies a 
critical position in the state’s integration spectrum since its ethnic heterogeneity 
combined with the vast territory poses a potentially destabilizing source for China. 
The remoteness of its location in the northwest frontier region of China elevates its 
importance when discussing the issue of national stability and unity. Thus, it is no 
wonder that the social disturbance, especially of the Uyghur movement, has aroused 
                                                 
7 Gerald Segal, ‘China’s Changing Shape’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 3, May/Jun 1994, pp.43-58. 
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serious attention of the Chinese government. In addition, Xinjiang’s potentially rich 
petroleum and mineral assets and its strategic location at the heart of the Eurasian 
continent have ensured its importance in the international dimension. In the past, 
Xinjiang’s position at the interesting fringes of three great empires made it the prize 
in the ‘Great Game’ of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, sought after 
by the Chinese, the Russian, and the British.8 At present, its strategic position in 
Central Asia still makes the Chinese government cautious about the rising influence 
of the United States on this region, in tandem with Russia.  
Second, this article might help to enrich our understanding of the real situation 
of the Uyghur people. Despite the efforts taken by the central state to contain ethno-
nationalism, ethnic conflict began to intensify from the early 1980s.9 There is much 
controversy in present literature about the future scenario of Uyghur activism. Some 
believe in the power of the central government and its ability to deal with the 
minority issues. They predict the gradual subsiding and fading away of ethno-
nationalism. Others claim that ethno-nationalism has the potential to mobilize the 
Uyghur people to engage in a ‘Holy War’ to fight for their independence. This study, 
hopefully, may shed light on the controversy. 
                                                 
8 Calla Wiemer, the Economy of Xinjiang, unpublished scripts. 
9 Herbert S. YEE, ‘Ethnic Relations in Xinjiang: a survey of Uygur-Han relations in Urumqi’, Journal 
of Contemporary China, 2003, 12, August,  p.431. 
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1.3 Hypothesis 
The Uyghur’s East Turkestan independence movement is an ethnically based 
social movement. To analyze the emergence and development of social movement, 
scholars conventionally use three broad sets of factors: political opportunity, 
mobilizing structure, and framing process.10 Each factor puts its emphasis on different 
level of analysis. Proponents of political opportunity emphasize the influence of the 
broad political environment and structure. Mobilizing structure explores the 
capability of formal social movement organizations. Framing process examines how 
the individual grievance converts to collective awareness and how the mass is 
mobilized to action.  
My study mainly subscribes to the first view, which emphasizes the influence 
of political opportunity factor and is called ‘political process approach.’  Michael 
Lipsky urged political analysts to pay attention to the stages and fluctuations in the 
American political system that might influence the openness of the system to specific 
groups. After examining the ‘riot behavior’ in forty-three American citites, Peter 
Eisinger found that ‘the incidence of protest is … related to the nature of a city’s 
political opportunity structure’, which he defined as ‘the degree to which groups are 
                                                 
10 Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, Comparative Perspective on Social 
Movement (Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.2. 
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likely to be able to gain access to power and to manipulate the political system.11 This 
political process approach to study social movement was further theorized by Charles 
Tilly, Doug MacAdam, and Sidney Tarrow, who firmly established the link between 
institutionalized politics and social movement.12 Seeking to understand the emergence 
of particular movements, proponents of political process model sought to link the 
initial development of insurgency to an expansion in political opportunities beneficial 
to the challenging group. 13  They share a same underlying conviction: social 
movements and revolutions are shaped by the broader set of political constraints and 
opportunities unique to the national context in which they are embedded.14 
These scholars have found that social movements have been associated with 
state building, which has a great effect on changing the political opportunity structure. 
Alexis de Tocqueville was the first scholar who provided his observation on the link 
between the state and collective action.15  By comparing France and America, he 
claimed that state centralization of France had provided opportunities for the French 
Revolution. Though his argument regarding the role of state centralization in 
fomenting social movement was excessive, his emphasis on state-building as the 
                                                 
11 Ibid, p.23. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid.,  p.29. 
14 Ibid, p.3. 
15 Zheng Yongnian, ‘State Rebuilding, Popular Protest and Collective Action in China’, Japanese 
Journal of Political Science, (Cambridge University Press 2002, 3 (1) ), p.47. 
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source of movement opportunities was right on target.16 Charles Tilly, in ‘Social 
Movements and National Politics’, traces the emergence of ‘national social 
movements’ in nineteenth-century Europe. In his depiction, the changes in the state 
policy have brought corresponding changes in the popular protest: ‘Popular uprisings 
in the early modern period were largely defensive efforts to resist taxes and the loss 
of local control over food and food prices. During the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, as state structures were nationalized and electoral politics evolved, popular 
agitation also underwent profound changes.’17 Donatella Della Porta compares the 
protest policing between Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany after World War 
II, and suggests it has an important effect on social movement.18 
Using the political process approach, I will show how changes in the political 
system create new possibilities for collective action of the Uyghur people. To be more 
specific, the hypothesis is that the state re-building program from 1978 has provided 
opportunities to the Uyghur’s collective insurgences. Deng Xiaoping’s re-ascension 
to power in 1978 and his reform initiated soon after have brought momentous 
changes to the political landscape of China. I argue that, with the original purpose of 
assuring the power of the state, the state re-building actually has caused changes 
                                                 
16 Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, Mayer N. Zald, op.cit, p.49. 
17 Charles Bright, and Susan Harding ed., Statemaking and Social Movements: Essays in History and 
Theory (The University of Michigan Press, 1984), p.11. 
18 Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, Mayer N. Zald, op.cit., p.62. 
  13
outside as well as inside the ethnic groups, changes favorable for the formation of 
ethnic political movement.  
The state rebuilding from 1978 reform comprises a transformation from formal 
control to informal control, from mainly political integration to mainly economic 
integration. This change might alter the interests of contending groups, cause the 
growth of the self-awareness of the national identity of the Uyghur, open more space 
for the social movement organizations, and provide more opportunities for the social 
activists, leading to the escalation of the Uyghur nationalism and the collective action.  
1.4 Literature review 
Attracted by worsening ethnic relation between the Uyghur and the Han 
Chinese from 1980s, scholars have tried to locate the underlying stimulation for the 
restless protest behavior of the Uyghurs.  Among the scholarly analysis of the 
ethnopolitics of Uyghur people, there are mainly two perspectives. 
One perspective delves with the roots of the contemporary ethno-nationalism of 
Uyghurs. A common approach of this school is the historical approach, which 
emphasizes the role of historical experience and memories in the formation of ethno-
nationalism. June Teufel Dreyer is one of the pioneering western scholars studying 
ethnopolitics in China. In her famous book China’s Forty Millions, she has studied 
the development of PRC minority policy intended to hasten the integration of the 
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minorities to the China Proper. Dreyer notes that the results of PRC policy have 
differed widely in different areas: receptivity to efforts at integration has been uneven 
among minority groups. Together with Tibet and Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang is listed as 
one of the regions most difficult to integrate. 19  Dreyer suggests six factors that 
significantly influenced the success of the progress of integration: the degree of 
assimilation of an ethnic group to Han Chinese society; lack of cohesiveness of the 
culture of a given ethnic group; the degree of dispersion of ethnic group members 
among Han Chinese; and so on. Her observation about the variation of ethno-
nationalism among different ethnic groups is very instructive; however, she fails to 
notice the variation of ethno-nationalism within one group along different periods. 
Following the idea of Dreyer, many scholars have looked at the root of ethno-
nationalism from the historical perspective. David Wang claims that the 
independence experience of the Three Districts (the East Turkestan Republic of 1944-
1949) in Xinjiang has been imprinted in the memory of the Uyghur people and it has 
been a symbol for the East Turkestan movement for several decades.20 Nader Hasan 
argues that since the Uyghur people are historically isolated with central China, and 
do not share religion, language, or ethnicity with the country’s majority Han Chinese, 
                                                 
19 June Teufel Dreyer, China’s Forty Millions: Minority Nationalities and National Integration in the 
People’s Republic of China (Harvard University Press: 1976). 
20 David Wang, The East Turkestan Movement in Xinjiang: a Chinese Potential Source of Instability? 
(Singapore: East Asian Institute, NUS, 1998). 
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the Uyghur are unwilling to submit their loyalty to Chinese authority. 21  These 
scholars are right since as a sense of belonging to a certain group, ethno-nationalism 
has evolved from some historical conditions. However, the re-emergence and 
development of ethno-nationalism results from a combination of internal as well as 
external factors. They fail to capture the variation of the manifestation of ethno-
nationalism in different episodes. The historical factor alone cannot account for why 
sometimes the collective challenge activities of Uyghur people appear so furious 
while in other periods they remain inert.  
Some scholars notice the role of the religious factor in the formation of ethno-
nationalism of Uyghur and offers cultural explanations for it. Iftikhar H. Malik, in 
Issues in Contemporary South and Central Asian Politics: Islam, Ethnicity and the 
State, highlights the role of Islam in binding the ethnic minorities. To him, Islam was 
not only a rallying point for the minority, but also a mechanism to defy the central 
authority, so it gained the name as ‘secularization-resistant’.22 By tracing the function 
of religion in the self-identification process, Malik gives a plausible explanation to 
the restive nature of the Muslim minority. Islam, in no doubt, forms a primary 
determinant to the assertiveness of the Uyghurs. But, again, the religious factor 
                                                 
21 Nader Hasan, ‘China’s Forgotten Dissenters’, Harvard International Review, (Fall 2000;22,3), p.38. 
22 Iftikhar H. Malik, ‘Issues in Contemporary South and Central Asian Politics: Islam, Ethnicity, and 
the State’, Asian Survey, Vol. 32, Issue 10, Oct., pp.888-901. 
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cannot wholly explain the question about the pattern of collective actions. The 
Uyghurs have converted their belief to Islam for centuries. However, the emergence 
and development of ethno-nationalism is of recent origin. Religion forms a basis for 
ethno-nationalism, but obviously not a primary determinant. 
The first perspective does provide valuable information of the construction of 
ethno-nationalism. However, there is surprising neglect of the phenomenon that the 
Uyghurs have different expressions of their ethno-nationalism in different periods. 
This limitation might result from the lack of concrete information. The CCP views 
ethno-nationalism as undesirable since it could lead to the disintegration of the state. 
Thus, study on it became a very sensitive topic in China. Before 1980s, the CCP put 
such strict restriction on the entry of foreigners to Xinjiang that independent field 
studies were virtually impossible. Fortunately, the ban on field research has begun to 
be lifted, if not completely, since the 1990s. Official documents were made more 
public and field studies to Xinjiang were permitted. Hence, my own field study in 
April and May of 2004. My present research will examine the relationship between 
state building and ethno-nationalism of Uyghurs, arguing that the changes brought by 
state building actually provide opportunities for ethno-nationalism to develop and 
break out. 
The second perspective does notice the variation of the manifestation of Uyghur 
ethno-nationalism and try to explain the sudden surge of Uyghur activism. Many 
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studies focus on the international influence on the ethno-nationalism of Uyghur. 
These foreign analysts have hypothesized that the independence of the Central Asian 
states had a demonstrative effect on Uyghurs. Sean L Yom argues that the Uyghur 
proto-separatist intensify their liberation activities when seeing their fellow Turkic 
Muslims of Central Asia having their own sovereign lands. Witt Raczka also 
examines the close relationship between Xinjiang and the Central Asia states, 
claiming that there is remarkable fluidity across what used to be called Central Asian 
Turkestan and the cross border contacts between Xinjiang and the Central Asia states 
have reached an unprecedented level.23  There is no denying the contagious effect of 
the independence movements of the Central Asia states in the neighborhood. But the 
seed of the East Turkestan movement has already germinated far before the 
dissolution of Soviet Union. From the early 1980s, the collective action of defiance of 
the Uyghurs has begun to resurface and intensify. There should be other factors in 
activating these activities. 
Justin Jon Rudelson, in the book Oasis Identities: Uyhgur Nationalism along 
China’s Silk Road, offers another explanation to the variation in expressions of 
Uyghur ethno-nationalism.24 In terms of its physical geography, Xinjiang is normally 
                                                 
23 Witt Raczka, ‘Xinjiang and its Central Asian Borderlands’, Central Asian Survey, (1998:17,3), p.373. 
24 Justin Jon Rudelson, Oasis Identities: Uyghur Nationalism along China’s Silk Road, (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1997). 
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associated with isolated oases in a desert. Rudelson argues that the geographical and 
social boundaries of the residence of Uyghur people shape the competing ethnic 
identities at the local oasis and regional level. Thus, this sentimental feeling about the 
oases of their birth makes the Uyghur’s ethno-nationalism fragmented. 25  His 
argument is insightful in explaining the evolution of ethno-nationalism in the long run. 
But it is not very compatible with the short-term variation that could be drawn from 
my data about these activities from 1949. According to his conclusion, ethno-
nationalism will grow with the modernization process, in which the accelerating 
communication and contact of the members within this group would sharpen their 
identity awareness. The picture of the development of ethno-nationalism should be on 
an upward trend. However, in reality, the intensity of the East Turkestan movement 
declined from the 1950’s peak, calmed down in the following two decades, and 
resurfaced in 1980s. The geographical factor as propounded by Rudelson cannot 
account for the undulating nature of the Uyghurs’ movement. My study will examine 
the broad political system in which the ethnic political movement is imbedded, 
showing how the changes in the state policy produced chances and constraints to the 
collective challenges. 




There are scholars who have noticed the influence of state policy on the 
development of ethno-nationalism. Barry Sautman studies the preferential policies for 
Xinjiang, which grants minority groups privileges in family planning, school 
admission, employment opportunities and promotion, business financing and taxation, 
as well as regional infrastructural support. Barry argues that contrary to the 
conventional belief that affirmative action everywhere inhibits economic efficiency 
and creates inter-ethnic tensions, the preferential policy has created greater social 
equity in Xinjiang.26 By putting most attention on the specific policy treatment of 
ethnic minorities, Barry has underestimated the changes on the grand political 
landscape—the state building process, which has more influences on ethno-
nationalism, influences that might have reverse effects in contrast with preferential 
policies. Some scholars notice the link between state building and ethno-nationalism, 
but they seem to have conflicting opinions on the relations between state’s 
modernization and ethno-nationalism. Collin Mackerras claims that the rising living 
standards accompanying modernization has at least smoothed the way for the national 
integration efforts of the central government and alleviated the resentments of the 
                                                 
26 Barry Sautman, ‘Preferential Policies for Ethnic Minorities in China: the case of Xinjiang’, in 
Nationalism and Ethnoregional Identities in China, William Safran. Ed., (UK and US: Frank Cass 
Publishers, 1998), pp.86-118. 
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minorities. 27  While Scott Fogden, in ‘Writing Insecurity: The PRC’s Push to 
Modernize China and the Politics of Uighur Identity’, posits that the PRC’s 
modernization program is in conflict with the interests of the Uyghur nationality, 
rendering insecure both the people of Xinjiang and the state’s integrity. Examining 
the material and ideational development brought about by the modernization program, 
especially in the post-Mao era, Fogden argues that these changes reinforced the 
Uyghur’s identity awareness, providing a motivating force of Uyghur’s resistance.28 
My study, it is hoped, could contribute further to the debate regarding the 
effectiveness of these program and policies in integration. It will not only explore the 
relations between state building and ethno-nationalism, but also delve into the 
rationale behind state building.  
1.5 Research Design 
This study is a case study of ethnopolitics in China. Using the Uyghur people, 
one of the most populous ethnic minorities in China, as a case, I will elaborate the 
dynamics between state building and ethno-nationalism, especially the ethnic 
contentious movement. 
                                                 
27 Collin Mackerras, China’s Minorities: Integration and Modernization in the Twentieth Century 
(New York : Oxford University Press , 1994). 
28 Scott Fogden, ‘Writing Insecurity: The PRC’s Push to Modernize China and the Politics of Uighur 
Identity’, Issues & Studies, Vol. 39, No. 3, Sep. 2003, pp.33-74. 
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In this study, the emergence of Uyghur East Turkestan movement is the 
phenomenon I want to explain; in other words, this phenomenon is the dependent 
variable. State building is the independent variable. The study employs two types of 
data, namely, published official documents and personal interviews. These data were 
mainly collected during my fieldwork in Xinjiang in April and May of 2004. The 
published official documents are used to show the trend and pattern of the 
development of the Uyghur East Turkestan movement since 1949. The interviews 
with the local people were conducted to obtain an in-depth understanding of the 
change of the ethnic identity consciousness. The interviews with the local officials 
were to get the information about the process of state building. 
Since the primary focus of this study is to explain the changing oscillations of 
the East Turkestan Independence Movement in China, the frequency of the 
occurrence of the popular protest occupies the main concern. Occurrence and non-
occurrence become the major values and features of the dependent variable. However, 
I should admit the reality is not so simple. First, the ‘repertoire’ of contention is 
colorful. The political opposition could take different forms. People could choose to 
break windows in protest, attack pilloried prisoners, tear down dishonored houses, 
stage public marches, petition, hold formal meetings, or organize special interest 
associations. The variation in the form of political contentious action should be 
categorized along a spectrum of occurrence. Second, the contentious movement 
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evolves over time. The repertoire is ‘learned cultural creation’ that results from the 
history of choice. This means that with the development of social movement, a set of 
routines is learned, shared and acted out by the activists. People learn from past 
experiences about how to conduct collective action, and what form of political 
opposition they should adopt. Thus, the political opposition that occurs later is 
different from the one that happened earlier. My classification of the East Turkestan 
independent movement might be a bit oversimplified. However, first of all, the 
perspective of this study is from the macro-level. It chiefly considers the relationship 
between state building and the up-and-down oscillations in the social movement. The 
emphasis put on macro-level does not suggest the ignorance or underestimation of the 
importance of the micro-level analytical framework, which pays more heeds to the 
subtle variation in the forms of collective action. Secondly, forms of contentious 
collective action are conditioned by the specific political culture and environment. In 
a certain society, people’s habits and expectations might determine what forms of 
collective action are likely to occur. The political culture and environment further 
confine the alternative ways of acting collectively to an observable litmus test of 
changes. For the East-Turkestan movement in Xinjiang, most opposition actions took 
the form of violent protests or rebellions due to the always-be repressive attitude of 
the Chinese state toward any open opponent. The repertoire of the East Turkestan 
Independence Movement is quite limited.  Finally, the practical condition does not 
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guarantee a systematic study on the micro-level of the ethnic political movement in 
China. Chinese government always keeps confidential the so-called ‘domestic affairs’. 
The difficulty of gaining access to data and information constitutes the major obstacle 
to the study of the micro-level aspects of these collective actions. The study of the 
repertoire of East Turkestan Independence Movement thus awaits the future 
information collection. 
This study endeavors to apply the political process model to explain the 
development of Uyghurs social movement in China, with special emphasis on the 
influence of the state rebuilding since 1978. It attempts to realize a framework for 
looking at how the state rebuilding has shaped the ethnic social movement. 
With this in mind, it will firstly be necessary to offer an overview of the 
development of East Turkestan Independence Movement, making way for a close 
examination of the causal mechanism between the state rebuilding and the re-
emergence of the Uyghurs’ popular protest. 
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Chapter 2 Ethno-nationalism and the East Turkestan 
Independence Movement 
In essence, nationalism is a psychological phenomenon. Nations are ‘groups 
whose core members share a distinctive and enduring collective identity based on 
cultural traits and lifeways that matter to them and to others with whom they 
interact.’29 Loyalty to the ethnic group is called nationalism. However, loyalty to the 
nation has often been confused with loyalty to the state.30 To avoid terminological 
confusion, I use ethno-nationalism instead of nationalism in this article to describe 
this feeling of imagined bond among an ethnic group. 
Ethno-nationalism is essentially a claim of nationhood, which, in the eyes of the 
members of that nation, is unique and distinct from others. The manifestation of 
ethno-nationalism varies with the types of politicized communal groups. According to 
Gurr’s classification, the Uyghur people belongs to national people, which ‘are 
regionally concentrated groups that have lost their autonomy to expansionist states 
but still preserve some of their cultural and linguistic distinctiveness and want to 
protect or reestablish some degree of politically separate existence.’ 31  Thus, the 
                                                 
29 Ted Robert Gurr, Minority at Risk (US: Institute of Peace Press, 1993), p.3. 
30 Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism—the Quest for Understanding (Princeton University Press, 1994). 
31 Ted Robert Gurr, op.cit., p.15. 
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ethno-nationalism of the Uyghur people has especially manifested in their political 
movement seeking separation or autonomy from the Chinese state. This communally 
based political movement is East Turkestan independence movement by the Uyghur 
activists and the western scholars. 
The East Turkestan Independence Movement is a kind of social movement. 
Sidney Tarrow defines social movements as collective challenges by people with 
common purposes and solidarity in sustained interaction with elites, opponents and 
authorities.32   According to the definition, social movements have four empirical 
properties: collective challenge, common purpose, solidarity and sustained interaction. 
The East Turkestan Independence Movement comprises of a series of collective 
challenges largely led by the Uyghur people in Xinjiang, who regard themselves as 
ethnically and religiously different from Han Chinese. Their unyielding struggles for 
self-determination have never disappeared since the Manchus invasion.33 To sketch a 
more complete picture of this movement, the chapter will begin with a brief 
introduction about its background, then go to a detailed examination about the pattern 
of the up and down of this movement since the establishment of P. R. China. What 
                                                 
32 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics (Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), p.4. 
.33  http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/1730/buh.html, (June 7, 2004). 
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causes the re-appearance of the East Turkestan Independence Movement and what 
conditions its growth will be discussed in the following chapters. 
2.1 The origin of the Ughurs and their independence movement 
All social movements are historically rooted and the East Turkestan 
Independence Movement is no exception. About one thousand and five hundred years 
ago the Turks34 were nomads living in Central Asia.35 The word ‘Turk’ means ‘strong 
and powerful’.36 Around 552 AD, in the Mongolian prairie the Turks set up the Turk 
Khanate Kingdom which later split into two parts: the East Turk Khanate and the 
West Turk Khanate. In 744 AD during the Tang Dynasty, the East Turk Khanate was 
conquered by Huihe,37 while the Tang Court eliminated the West Turk Khanate.38 
Since then, the Huihe Khanate replaced the Turk Khanate. According to official 
Chinese documents, the Huihe people were the ancestors of the Uyghurs inXinjiang.39 
The Huihe Khanate largely followed the rule of the Turk Khanate in terms of its 
political system, culture and language. Thus, the Uyghurs also consider themselves 
descendents of the Turk. Before the invasion of the Manchus in 1759, the Uyghurs 
                                                 
34 Turks in Chinese is  ‘突厥人’. 
35 David Wang, op.cit., p.3. 
36 Li Sheng, The History and Present Condition of Xinjiang in China (Urumqi: Xinjiang People Press, 
2003), p.33.   
37 Huihe is a minority group in ancient China. 
38 David Wang, op.cit., p.3. 
39Li Sheng, op.cit., p.76. 
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had established several Kingdoms in this northwestern region in history that 
constituted de facto independence for quite some time.  
Living in a place remote from the central China and having enjoyed de facto 
independence for a long time, the Uyghur people have established their distinct 
culture and lifestyle. Their ethnic identity awareness was accentuated by the 
expansion of Manchus in Qing Dynasty, which in their eyes was a foreign invasion.  
The Uyghur activists have revolted from time to time with the purpose of 
regaining their independence. Western scholars often call these collective challenges 
the ‘East Turkestan Independence Movement’. In the very beginning, the term 
‘Turkestan’ referred to the two rivers, the Syr Darya and the Amu Daya, valleys in 
Central Asia where the ancient Turks lived.40 Today, this term has transformed into a 
geo-political term referring to the vast land from central Asia to Turkey where 
Turkish speaking people live. The western part of Turkestan was conquered by 
Tsarist Russian in the 19th century, while the eastern part of Turkestan was 
incorporated formally into China Proper during Qing Dynasty. It was not until the 
Qing Dynasty when this region was named Xinjiang, meaning ‘newly-recovered old 
territory’41 and was incorporated as a province into China. After the CCP took power, 
                                                 
40 David Wang, op.cit., p.3. 
41Ibid, p.4. 
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the central government established Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in this area 
in the 1950s. This region is the main battlefield of the Uyghur’s political movement. 
2.2 Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism  
Finding symbols that will be familiar enough to mobilize people around is one 
of the major tasks of social movement. The social movement entrepreneurs have to 
find cultural symbols that can elicit resonance and support of the masses. In this case, 
Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism assume the role of ideological template. They act as 
the guideline of the movement, providing the meaning for the movement as well as 
sustaining the movement. 
Pan-Turkism began in the late 19th century and its purpose was to unify all the 
Turkish-speaking peoples and to establish a Pan-Turkish state in the area from Inner 
Asia to Turkey.42 Pan-Islamism also began in the late 19th century. It appealed to all 
Islamic countries and the Islamic people to establish a universal Islamic state under 
the leadership of the Turkish Sultan.43  
                                                 
42 Ibid, p.3. 
43Yang Faren ed., Studies on Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism (Institute of Social Science of Xinjiang, 
1994), p.61. 
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Due to the proximity of emerging time and appealing targets, these two 
ideologies have been closely interwoven since they spread to Xinjiang.44 Being a 
Turkish nationality as well as a Muslim nation,45 the Uyghur soon embraced these 
two ideologies in their advocacy for independence. In the early 20th century, a Turk 
from Turkey called Ahment Kamel came to Xinjiang to propagate Pan-Turkism. 
Some Ughurs, who had been educated in Turkey, also started their Pan-Islamic 
mission in Xinjiang. 46  The essential ideas of Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism in 
Xinjiang can be summarized in a concise three-sentence slogan: ‘Our homeland is 
East Turkestan; our nation is Turkish; our religion is Islam.’47  
These ideologies had considerable influence on the Uyghurs independence 
movement. One the one hand, Pan-Turkism provides a cognitive framework in which 
the Turkish identity is emphasized and demarcated. It effectively appeals to the 
nationhood sentiment of the Uyghur people by drawing a clear racial line between the 
Uyghur and the Han Chinese. It gives meaning to the social movement and also offers 
a justification for the collective actions under the name of a nationalist movement. On 
the other hand, both Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism are effective tools in advocating 
and fostering cooperation and trust between the Uyghur people and the other Turkic 
                                                 
44 Ibid. 
45 In the middle of 10 century, the Karahanid Kingdom of the Ughur adopted Islam religion. 
46 David Wang, op.cit., p.4. 
47Yang Faren ed., op.cit., p.139. 
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and co-religionist ethnic groups in Xinjiang. The Kazakh people is a good example. It 
has been recorded that in many East Turkestan independence activities there were a 
quite large number of Kazaks involved either as common participants or even as 
leaders.   
The Uyghurs, who wanted to free themselves from Chinese domination, have 
never given up their struggles. Before 1949, the Uyghurs had staged several uprisings 
against the Chinese rule. And twice, in 1933 and 1944, the Uyghurs were successful 
in setting up an independent Eastern Turkestan Republic. Though these independent 
republics were overthrown in a short time, these historical facts that the group had 
once governed its own affairs have inspired the Uyghurs to keep pursuing their 
independence whenever afforded the opportunity to do so. Their activities of 
challenge persisted in the era of P. R. China. The pattern of these activities since 1949 
is the focus of this study. It is chosen as a case to study the dynamics between state 
building and ethno-nationalism in China. Based on data from official document, the 
following part includes a detailed discussion about the ebb and flow of the collective 
challenges since 1949. 
2.3 The East Turkestan Independence Movement in the P. R. China 
Since 1949 
As the cliché goes, ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’, a 
man’s freedom fighter could be another man’s terrorist. From this perspective of the 
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Chinese government, the East Turkestan Independence Movement is a vicious 
separatist activity which not only causes social turmoil but also endangers national 
unity and security. The Chinese government has always stressed the famous historical 
episodes of Tang and Han Dynasty, in which the Chinese state had claimed the 
occupation of this northwest region. It also insists that Xinjiang has been an integral 
part of China since then. The point of this argument is not to demonstrate which side 
holds more justice, nor is it to show more sympathy to one side. The argument here is 
that since the CCP also holds the same view on this issue, high on its agenda is to 
integrate this restive region into the China Proper when it assumed power in 1949.  
To solve the ‘thorn on its back’, Beijing has adopted various policies and 
strategies in its state building project. Nonetheless, the state building program has not 
achieved an apparent success so far. Though the East Turkestan movement seemed to 
subside in the 1970s, it became more fierce and active again from 1980.  
The table below contains the entire officially documented major ‘counter-







Table 2.1 The Political Actions of the Uyghurs from 1950 to 1997 
Time Place(S=Southern Xinjiang, 
N=Northern 
Xinjiang) 












Dec. 26th  
N Rebellion of the 
garrison troops in 
Zhaosu 
Rebellion 




Dec. 31st, 1954 S Abdu.Imit’s Riot Rebellion 
Mar. 9th ,1956—
Mar. 11th  
S Bahai. Damara’s 
Riot 
Rebellion 
May 4th, 1956 S Abdu.kadelhari’s 
Riot 
Rebellion 
May 24th, 1956 S Jelilihari’s Riot Rebellion 
April 15th, 1957 S Hailiqihan’s Riot Rebellion 





N Haliman and 
Jukan’s Rebellion 
Rebellion 








Dec. 11th  
S Aisan. Alipu’s 
Riot 
Rebellion 
1960s May 29th, 1962 N Ili Disturbances 










Aug. 20th, 1969 S Ahunov’s Riot Rebellion 
Apr. 9th, 1980 S Riot in Aksu Violent Protest 
Jan. 13th, 1981 S Disturbance in 
Yecheng 
Violent Protest 
May 27th, 1981 S Riot in Jiashi 
County 
Rebellion 
Oct. 30th, 1981 S Riot in Kashghar Violent Protest 
Dec. 12th, 1985 N Demonstration in 









Apr. 5th, 1990 S Riot in Baren 
County 
Rebellion 
1991 S Robbing Case in 
Shaya 
 
Feb. 5th, 1992 N Bombing in 
Urumqi 
 
Jul. 7th, 1995 S Demonstration in 
Hetian 
Violent Protest 
Aug. 14th, 1995 N March in Ining Violent Protest 
Feb. 5th, 1997 N March in Ining Violent Protest 
1990s 
Feb. 25th, 1997 N Bombing in 
Urumqi 
 
Source: Ma Dazheng, National Interest is beyond Everything--Observations and 
Reflections on the Xinjiang Stability (Institute of Social Science of China, 2002) 
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Some caveats relating to the reliability and validity of the data should be 
discussed before further analysis. In the first place, some people may doubt the 
reliability of the Chinese official data. As we know, China is an authoritarian state 
whose information and archives are under rigorous control, especially those related to 
state unity and security. This situation is also applicable to the East Turkestan 
Movement in Xinjiang. Chinese authorities used to tightly control all information and 
depict a picture of a firmly stable society. However, things have changed since the 
event of September 11th , when many regimes of the world have seized on the US 
Global War against Terrorism to justify their crucial repression of Muslim or some 
no-Muslim minorities.  Beijing adopted similar strategy: it planned to crush the East 
Turkestan Movement under the name of anti-terrorism and began to provide evidence 
that points to the movement as a terrorist one. The information about the East 
Turkestan Movement was then made known to the public. To avoid the possibility 
that the Chinese government exaggerated the frequency of the social disturbance to 
justify the state’s harsh crackdown, I also checked some interior archives that were 
published before the event of September 11th and only permitted access to 
governmental personnel. The two sources only differ slightly in their way of narration.   
The second caveat worth highlighting is that it is the government who decides 
what should be called ‘anti-revolutionary movement’ or ‘separatist activity’ and what 
should be documented, so it is understandable that only major social disturbances can 
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be found in its published archives because of the premium placed on political and 
social stability. However, the article here is mainly concerned about the trend and 
pattern of the frequency of the East Turkestan movement, which would not be 
affected even if there are some systematic biases in the data.  Finally, the information 
about the number of people involved and those arrested shows a wide divergence 
between the official data and the data from the Uyghur social movement organization, 
with the former tending to conceal the abuse of force and the latter trying to 
exaggerate the degree of suffering. Though this discrepancy might cause some 
problems in assessing the scale and nature of such disturbances, still, it will not distort 
the picture of the frequency of the collective challenges.  
The table traces the ups-and-downs of the East Turkestan independence 
movement in the new era since the CCP came to power. Because of the intransigence 
of the opposition by the CCP to the East Turkestan movement, it is not surprising that 
most social challenges appeared in violent forms.  
From the table, we can see that during the past 50 years since the establishment 
of the People’s Republic in 1949, the East Turkestan movement has experienced four 
major stages of development. The first was the 1950s phase during which the CCP 
just took control of Xinjiang and faced fierce opposition from the locals. Fourteen 
major ‘counter-revolutionary riots’ occurred in this period. The most widely-known 
one was in Khotan in Dec. 1954 led by Abdu. Imit., a Sufi shaykh. Imit formulated an 
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‘Islamic Republic Program’ as the guideline for the riot. According to an official 
source, the riot was plotted by Mohmet Emin Burgra, an influential figure of the 
TIRET (Turkish-Islamic Republic of East Turkestan) in 1940s. Imit was an 
apprentice of Emin. This kind of collective challenges was initiated mainly by some 
influential religious figures. Another considerable resistance was from the former 
leaders and troops of the TIRET. After ‘the peaceful liberation’ of Xinjiang, the 
troops of the TIRET48 were reorganized and incorporated into the People’s Liberation 
Army. However, many militants were unwilling to surrender their cherished 
independence. Led by some elites, they undertook severe action of defiance. The one 
led by Usman, who is a Kazahk, lasted for nearly five years and inspired the 
following several resurgences by the militants.49 
The second phase was the 1960s, during which the CCP had established 
systematic political and social system and the volatile situation in Xinjiang began to 
calm down. The most famous event was the case of the East Turkestan People’s 
Revolutionary Party (ETPRP). It is considered by Chinese authorities to have been 
the single largest resistance organization in Xinjiang since 1949 and was founded 
around 1967. Taking advantage of the chaotic phase of the Cultural Revolution, the 
                                                 
48 The Chinese authority prefers the other alternative name: the troops of the Three Revolutionary 
Districts. 
49 Michael Dillon, Xinjiang : China's Muslim Far Northwest (New York : RoutledgeCurzon, 2003),  
p.55. 
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ETPRP was able to develop rapidly. Chinese researchers estimate that there were 
over 300 party members ranging from southern Xinjiang to northern Xinjiang.50  
Despite the large-scale nature of the ETPRP, it did not successfully mount 
collective challenges except some plans to rob banks, shops, grain stores and 
warehouses to raise funds.  The only one major rebellion documented by the 
government was the riot led by Ahunov, the secretary of the Southern Xinjiang 
Branch of the ETPRP. On August 20th 1969, Ahunov led a group of ETPRP members 
to take two vehicles and a large number of weapons and set out from Kashghar and 
Mekit from the Soviet border to solicit support for their cause and establish a base for 
their pro-independence activities. The group was surrounded by Chinese troops near 
Suhkaz in the Atush region the following day. The rising was effectively crushed by 
the Chinese troops before it even began.51 
The Kazakh exodus, which included some Uyghur people, was another major 
disturbance in 1960s. Though the Kazakh exodus in 1962 was combined with violent 
protest and caused disturbances in Ili, it reflected that many people chose to leave 
their hometown rather than directly oppose the Chinese authorities when they were 
discontented.  
                                                 
50Ma Dazheng, National Interest is beyond Everything—Observations and Reflections on the Xinjiang 
Stability (Institute of Social Science of China, 2002), p.45.  
51 Michael Dillon, op.cit.,  p.51. 
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The three events in the 1960s showed the collective challenge activities were on 
decline.52  
The ensuing third phase, the 1970s, was a strikingly peaceful period where no 
major collective action occurred. However, it did not mean that the resistance 
disappeared completely or that there was no resistance. Some researchers argued that 
the opposition activities and organizations persisted underground. But it is safe to say 
that even though resistance and opposition existed, the opposition forces could not 
find the opportunity to inspire enough support to form collective challenges.  
However, the peace was ephemeral and the following fourth phase was 
extremely disturbing. The table shows that the collective action re-appeared in 1980s 
and became more active in 1990s. The re-emergence of the collective defiance began 
from some spontaneous disturbances. On April 9th 1980 in Aksu County, a Han 
Chinese police arrested a Uyghur fellow and tortured him to death. This event fuelled 
a serious outbreak of social disturbance. More than 3000 Uyghur people formed a 
violent march the next day, which ended with clashes with the Han people and 
sabotage on public properties. Violence resurfaced after a decade of silence. A series 
of collective challenges followed.  
                                                 
52 In fact, Ahunov’s riot is a part of the ETPRP movement. Thus, the number of disturbances could be 
counted as two.  
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The Yecheng disturbance on Jan 13th 1980 was a violent response to an 
accidental fire in a mosque.  There were disturbances in Kashghar on October 30th 
1981 as a result of a criminal trial in which a young Han man was accused of killing a 
Uyghur youth during a fight.  
The students also came to be involved in opposition activities. In Urumqi, over 
2,000 students from seven universities and higher education colleges demonstrated on 
December 12th 1985 during local elections when the regional governor was replaced 
by a protégé of the Han CCP secretary Wang Enmao. There were also demonstrations 
in June 1988 after racialist slogan was allegedly found on a toilet door at Xinjiang 
University in Urumqi.  
During the 1990s, political violence gradually spread throughout the region. As 
the decade progressed, the conflict became more severe and more organized. The 
crucial event that happened at Baren Village in Akto County in April 1990 was a 
turning point.53 A group of Uyghur men attending prayers at a mosque on April 5th 
began criticizing CCP policies towards ethnic minorities. This developed into a mass 
protest with some activists calling for a jihad54  to drive the Han people out of 
Xinjiang and to establish an East Turkestan State. Upheavals continued on April 6th 
                                                 
53 Michael Dillon, op.cit., p.62. 
54 Means ‘a holy war’. 
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with rioters firing small arms and throwing bombs at police and officials who 
surrounded them, and blowing up part of the local government building. Within two 
days, the riot was bloodily put down. It marked the first time the Chinese authorities 
blamed an Islamic group-the Islamic Party of East Turkestan-for inspiring and 
plotting the uprising.55 There were conflicting reports of the number of causalities in 
the insurrection, with the foreign press claiming over sixty people dead and Tomur 
Dawamant, Chairman of the Autonomous Regional Government, admitting that 
sixteen ‘ruffians’ had been killed.  
On Feb. 5th 1997, hundreds of Uyghur youths took a march to oppose the 
arbitrary arrest of some Uyghur people by the local government. The March in Ining 
involved nearly one thousand Muslims and ended up in anti-Han bloodshed and the 
looting of shops. This march was the most serious political turmoil since 1962. 
According to Chinese authorities, the Feb. 5th ‘beating, smashing and looting’ 56 
incident was not an accident; rather it had been well planned and organized in 
advance. The Eastern Turkestan Islamic Party of Allah (Dong Tujuesitan Yisilan 
Zhenzhudang) was allegedly responsible for carrying out this event. 
                                                 
55 David Wang, op.cit., p.11. 
56 This term is a literal translation of the Chinese word ‘Da-Za-Qiang’. 
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Besides several other similar disturbances that happened in 1995, the repertoire 
of the East Turkestan independence movement in 1990s also incorporated some 
extremism programs including assassination and bombing. The bombings on bus in 
1992 and 1997 resulted in several deaths and many injured. Though the CCP has 
some justification in labeling these activities as ‘terrorism’, it is also true that these 
activities resulted from the situation that the CCP ruthlessly repressed the opposition 
and denied them the institutional channel to express their grievances. It is apparent 
that the real situation is more serious than that showed by the table because many 
minor scale activities were not listed. Abdulahat Abdurixit, Xinjiang’s provincial 
governor, noted that ‘since the start of the 1990s, if you count explosions, 
assassinations, and other terrorist activities, it comes to a few thousand incidents.’ 
In all, the social upheavals in 1990s persisted, developed and became more 
serious. Citing the comment of Ma Dazheng, a Chinese famous specialist on Xinjiang 
issues, ‘from 1980s, especially in 1990s, the separatist force in Xinjiang has 
intensified their destructive activities. A distinguished character of their activities in 
this phase is well-organized.’57 
The East Turkestan movement is a manifestation of ethno-nationalism. The 
activists insist that ‘Uyghurs and Han Chinese are not of the same race. Uyghurs is 
                                                 
57 Ma Dazheng, op.cit., p.63. 
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clearly a European race and look primarily like Western Europeans. Uyghuristan is 
situated beyond the natural boundary of China in a separate geographical site with 
96% of its population being Turkic peoples in 1949.’58  It is this perception that draws 
a clear racial line between Uyghur and Han Chinese and set the two groups apart. It is 
the salience of this belief in ethnic identification that inspires that Uyghur people to 
assert their distinctive identity. Their collective challenges continued to the era of P. 
R. China.: It declined from the 1950s peak, calmed down in 1960s, remained 
relatively silent throughout 1970s, and resurfaced again at the beginning of 1980s. It 
further slid into extremism in 1990s. What can account for the up and down of the 
Uyghur collective challenges? There are a number of factors. I argue that state 
building played a major role in fostering the growth of East Turkestan movement. As 
mentioned earlier, it is not the intention of state building to give life to social 
movements; on the contrary, it aims to contain those dissenting voices and fractional 
forces. The shift in the state policy from 1978, with its original purpose of assuring 
and expanding the power of the state, actually provides opportunity for ethno-
nationalism and for the ethnic political movement. 
The next chapter will trace the evolving nature of the state building and the 
rationale behind such changes. Before exploring further the process of state building, 
                                                 
58 http://www.uygur.org/enorg/history/uygurlar_kim.htm (May 24, 2004). 
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I would like to explain why the role of state is so important in this enterprise. First of 
all, China is an authoritarian regime. The central government commands all vital 
resources, especially during the Mao era. Though the state experienced and is 
experiencing decentralization, the power of the state should not be underestimated. 
Second of all, although the state occupies a very important role, it is not an 
omnipotent entity. Scholars have come to recognize that state is no longer ‘an 
internally rationalized bureaucracy immune to popular influences or governed by self-
generated rules’; rather, state can be regarded ‘as the arena of routinized political 
competition in which class, status, and political conflicts, representing both elites and 
popular interests, are played out.’59 Thus, state is essentially a part of society. State 
building, though it is initiated by the state, would not completely follow the will of 
the state. During the interaction between state and social forces, state building might 
spawn unexpected results including the growth of ethno-nationalism and the outbreak 
of ethnic challenge. 
                                                 
59 Bright and harding, ‘Processes of Statemaking and Popular Protest’, In Bright and harding eds., 
Statemaking and Social Movement, p.3. 
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Chapter 3 From Formal to Informal Control---State 
Rebuilding Since 1978 
Different states or governments employ different means of behavior control 
according to the orientation of their political ideologies. Broadly, the control takes 
two forms: formal control and informal control. The former one is explicit and makes 
strict prescription about what should not be done and what is intolerable. Early states 
often adopted this kind of control to impose rigid regulations and rules formally on its 
inhabitants, from without, and with a very heavy hand. People who violated these 
behavior rules and regulations were subject to draconian punishment. But beyond 
these clear boundaries it left its subjects largely alone.60 
The latter, in contrast with the former shifts the locus of control internally. The 
modern state elevated the status of citizens to the participants in their own governance. 
The ideology held by the state is no longer imposed by coercive force on the subjects, 
rather it is naturally indoctrinated in the mind of the people. The citizens govern 
themselves ‘in terms of their own moral, instinctual and emotionally economy, 
limiting their actions before the fact and moderating their impulses’. 
                                                 
60 T.V.  Paul, G.John Ikenberry and John A Hall. ed., The Nation-State in Question (Princeton 
University Press, 2003), p.106. 
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The state rebuilding that happened in the post-Mao era in China marks a shift 
from a formal control system to an informal control one. While the term ‘state 
rebuilding’ can be defined in different ways, its meaning in this study is twofold. It 
refers to, first, the efforts to transform China’s economic system from a socialist-
oriented to a capitalist-oriented one, and, second, the accompanying efforts in the 
other fields to aid the transformation. Thus, the state rebuilding, to a great extent, 
overlaps ‘reforms’.  
Before elaborating the transformation process, the concept of ‘state rebuilding’ 
deserves more explanations. First, as a part of state building, this state rebuilding aims 
to consolidate the power of the state. The reform taken by the Chinese leadership is a 
necessary reaction and remedy to the plight brought about by the formal rigid control 
system. In the following narration of the transformation, I will show that while the 
formal control system has afforded the state overwhelming power over the society, it 
is highly unsustainable. The problems and evils embedded in the over-centralized 
system have caused serious crises of legitimacy for the state. It is urgent and 
necessary to find a suitable system to replace the old one. In the reform, which will be 
discussed in the following part, the Chinese state adopts the mechanism of 
marketization to substitute the former coercive system. The advantages of the market 
mechanism will also be discussed later.  Though from appearance, some measures of 
the reform seem to lead to partial decentralization of political power and live up to the 
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brand of ‘state building’, in essence, they are indispensable parts of a systematic 
transformation that would work more effectively to maintain the control of the state 
on society. These measures, such as the retreat of political power from the economic 
field, the loosening of social control, etc., are requirements of the market economy. 
That is to say, as components of the systematic transformation, whose purpose is to 
maintain and consolidate the governing of the state, these measures could be regarded 
as ‘state rebuilding’; even though they might have a certain counter state-building 
function superficially.  Second, though state building ‘involves not only state 
initiatives and the reactions of social groups to them, but also social mobilizations 
which target the state and trigger responses by its governors’61, the state re-building, 
in this section, mainly focuses on the state initiatives, namely, how the Chinese 
leadership tries to rebuild the state in the post-Mao era. Nevertheless, I also endorse 
the idea that considers reforms as gradual and evolutionary processes. ‘Reforms were 
not clearly foreseen or designed in advance, and so the elements of the reform have 
inescapably been time-depending. Reforming without a blueprint, neither the process 
nor the ultimate objective was clearly envisaged beforehand.’62 The reform proceeds 
step-by-step without a prior complete scheme. In Deng’s famous metaphor, the 
                                                 
61 Charles Bright and Susan Harding ed.,op.cit, p.10. 
62 Barry Naughton, Growing out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform, 1978-1993 (NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), p.5. 
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process is ‘groping for stones to cross the river’. The state initiates and re-initiates its 
reform plans with amendments in the process of their interaction with the society. 
Though the state re-building is appreciated as a long and gradual process, it is 
regrettable that the constraint of length of this article prevents a more detailed 
narrative of the reform process. This paper would only look at the changes brought 
about by the reform, while bearing in mind that the reform process has been marked 
not only by substantial ex post coherence, but also by significant resilience.63 
The state re-building from 1978 has brought tremendous changes to the society 
of China. The Chinese leadership initially put much effort on restructuring the 
stagnating planned economy system through re-importing the mechanism of market. 
The rewarding economic reform further provided incentives and necessitated other 
corresponding changes in the political and social areas. Though the process proceeded 
gradually and comprised twists and turns, it kept heading in the direction of 
transformation—from formal control to informal control64.  
                                                 
63 Ibid. 
 
64 The change mainly happened in the economic and cultural areas, and the CCP never gave up the 
formal control in the political area.  
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This state re-building that happened at the national level has had a far-reaching 
influence on the East Turkestan independence movement. This momentous change, it 
can be argued, provides opportunities for social movement.  
This subsequent section will provide a selective overview of this state re-
building: besides documenting the major changes that happened at the national level, 
it also records some specific policies adopted in Xinjiang. By examining the 
difference between formal control and informal control models, it will also explore in 
depth the rationale of state rebuilding. The reasons supportive of the reform primarily 
include two parts: the undesirable problems resulting from the former system and the 
benefits of the latter system.  
The analysis begins with the depiction of the formal control system in the 
Mao’s era.  
3.1 Formal Control in Mao’s Era 
Having led the Chinese Communist Party from it arduous Long March to 
victory over both Japan and the Guomindang, Mao Zedong had established his 
preeminent leadership position by the time of the founding of the People’s Republic 
of China in 1949. His ideas about governance henceforth profoundly shaped the 
political system of China. Ambitious to re-construct the whole society of China and 
achieve substantial development, Mao and his colleagues put serious efforts in setting 
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up an extraordinary governing system, which featured the model of formal control in 
virtually all primary aspects of the economy, politics and social life. The entire 
system centered on a command economic structure with necessary assortative 
political and social arrangements.  
3.1.1 Command economy 
The Chinese leaders including Mao traditionally believed that citizens cannot 
understand what is best for society and therefore do not have the right to demand that 
the leaders adopt policies the citizens prefer. 65  In addition, Mao believed that 
economic growth could be achieved by increasing the amounts of labor, capital goods, 
and land used in production, by improving the quality of these factors of production, 
by combining them in more efficient ways and inspiring labor to greater efforts, and 
more importantly, by taking advantage of economies of scale. 66  He was also 
ambitious to transform China quickly from an agricultural country into a major 
industrial economic power in the world. Such an industrial program requires a 
national planning system, which, in Mao’s view, could more effectively and 
systematically increase economic growth and allocate resources.  
                                                 
65 Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China: from Revolution through Reform (New York: W.W. Norton, 
1995), p.181. 
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Under the guidance of such idea, the Chinese leadership soon embraced the 
Soviet-style67 planned economy, or command economy system68. Command economy 
system has two fundamental characteristics. First, resource allocation decisions are 
made in response to commands from planners rather than in response to prices.69 The 
commands from the administrative hierarchy become the most important signals in 
the economic field, and the prices from the market are largely ignored. Second, 
command economies require the concentration of a large volume of resources in the 
hands of planners, allowing them to assume command of the economy as a whole. 
This attribute demands public ownership of the means of production.  
In practice, the command economy is well suited for a certain development 
strategy using several major control measures. Development strategy refers to the 
broad patterns in which the state determines the distribution and usage of resources.70 
The advantage of the command economy system was its ability to funnel state funds, 
materials and technical personnel into those key engineering projects. Material 
balance planning is the main technique used to run the economy. Material balance 
refers to the computation of resources and uses of an individual commodity that a 
                                                 
67 Scholars generally agree that the command economy system in China is relatively ‘coarse’ when 
compared with that of the Soviet Union. Coarse here means not following the original version to its 
letter. 
68 Barry Naughton, op.cit., p.26. 
69  Ibid. 
70 Ibid, p.27. 
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planner balances in allocating all supplies.71 It has three primary components: an 
output plan for individual producers, a supply plan that transfers resources among 
producers, and a schedule of material usage coefficients or norms that links inputs 
and outputs for individual producers.72 Other types of control were used to reinforce 
control over materials, such as control over personnel, control over career paths, and 
control over financial flows and credit. The Communist Party set up a list of jobs and 
controlled the appointment and the promotion of personnel. A monopolistic banking 
system was also created to audit compliance with state directives. Monetary flows 
were passive: they were assigned to facilitate completion of the plan, rather than 
shaping resource allocation flows themselves.73 
China had established a gigantic bureaucratic structure to monitor the economic 
activities. With the Soviets’ assistance, the Chinese set up a State Planning 
Committee in 1952.74 This committee was the forerunner of a series of planning 
commissions designated for short-term, long-term, as well as special purposes. Below 
these national commissions was erected a complete network of economic planning 
agencies, which further extended into the country’s two thousand counties and from 
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there into the cities and communes. 75  These departments helped convey the 
mandatory instructions of the central government from the top down to the lowest 
level units regarding what standards should be instituted. Enterprises totally lacked 
decision-making power and became simply appendages of state administrative 
agencies at different levels.76  Their daily routines were rigidly controlled by the 
relevant departments: enterprises did not have the right to sell their products on the 
market, products and materials were allocated by the state, even the labor force and 
wages were determined by the state. 
To smooth the way for planned economy, the state also claimed the public 
ownership of the means of production. The public ownership allowed the state to 
maintain direct-authority relations over most resources and products. Having 
launched several campaigns including Land Reform, Agricultural Cooperativization, 
and Socialist Transformation of Industry and Commerce, the state had successfully 
eliminated the private sectors in the economic field. The dominant public sectors took 
the form of either ‘ownership by the people’ (that is, state ownership) or ‘collective 
ownership’ (ownership by some group). In the rural areas, different collectivization 
organizations such as production teams (basic), production brigades (middle) and 
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people’s communes (advanced) were set up. In the urban areas, the state-owned 
enterprises accounted for the greatest proposition of the GDP of the whole country. 
The concept of private property was either vague or non-existent at that time. No one 
was permitted to have his or her private property. This public ownership structure 
guaranteed the rights of the state to issue mandatory instructions on various economic 
activities, ensuring a command economy system to function without obstacles.  
Another notable feature in this command economy was egalitarianism. ‘One of 
the most enduring substantive themes of Mao’s political program was the virtue of 
egalitarianism.’77 Maoists believed that while a principal aim of nations is to raise the 
level of material welfare of the population, this development is not worth much unless 
everyone rises together: no one should be left behind. At that time, China was a 
desperately poor country, where there was no practical way to raise most people’s 
standard of living in a short time. Egalitarianism meant leveling average income 
down to that of the poorer strata. Various administrative measures were also adopted 
to ensure minimal economic stratification. Thus, though in the vast territory of China, 
many factors including soil quality, amount of rainfall, access to transport, and so 
forth could lead to developmental difference in different areas, the living standard and 
income level witnessed no prominent differentials in one certain region.  
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The command economy and the implementation of egalitarianism principle 
directly affected the Uyghurs’ social movement in two aspects. The first was the 
equalized living standards among the people. There was no obvious gap in terms of 
income and living standards between Uyghurs and Hans living in Xinjiang. The state 
controlled the wages at a relatively stable level and tried to minimize the difference, 
leading to the absence of apparent stratification between Uyghurs and Hans. This, to a 
certain degree, alleviated the grievance that the Uyghurs might hold toward the Hans. 
It might also have diluted the Uyghurs’ awareness of being the ruled in their own 
region.  
The second result was the poverty and simplicity of people’s life. At that time, 
almost all people in China lived frugally because of the material shortage and 
economic backwardness caused by the long-time wars’ damage. People were working 
in publicly-owned units, which were under tight control of the higher level authority. 
They normally did not possess private property, which they could deal with at their 
will. The Uyghur activists could not get access to sufficient resources to mobilize 
supporters even if they wanted to undertake acts of defiance.  
3.1.2 Highly centralized administrative system in Mao’s era 
As stated earlier, the command economy system demands a rigorous 
administrative system in the political arena. Mao and his colleagues hence established 
a highly centralized administrative system to coordinate the command economy. It is 
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necessary to elaborate the political system in order to present a clearer picture of the 
formal control model. 
The Maoist administrative system also borrowed heavily from that of the Soviet 
Union because of the similar ideological orientation embraced by the two countries. 
Like the Soviets, the Chinese set up parallel national party and government (or state) 
administrative apparatuses. At each level of the political system in China—the center 
(Beijing), the province, the prefecture, the city, the county, and the locale (township 
or commune)—there was a full array of party and state organs. 78  
Two important features of this administrative system should be noted. First, this 
system was strictly hierarchical and highly centralized. The basic organizational 
structure, on both the party and the government sides, was largely duplicated at every 
level of the national administrative system. The leading party body in the center was 
the Politburo, in the province the Provincial Party Committee, in the County the 
County Party Committee, and so forth. The government bodies were simply called 
governments with their respective level such as provincial government, county 
government, etc. Every ministry, commission, and Central Committee department 
headed its own national bureaucratic hierarchy that extended from Beijing down 
through the provinces, cities, counties, and so forth. In all, this bureaucratic system 
                                                 
78 Kenneth Lieberthal, op.cit., p.77. 
  56
was highly centralized, with the lower level units made answerable to the higher level 
units. Thus, the local governments were, to a great extent, only executive organs of 
the state.   
The party system was the other distinguishable feature of the administrative 
system. The CCP enjoyed a paramount position in this system. The party penetrated 
the government at every level through a variety of means, including setting up party 
bodies (committees, branches, cells) in every government organ.79  Generally, the 
party made policies while the state administered them, but the reality was not that 
neat. The party structures always exercised ultimate authority over their government 
counterpart. It was greatly involved in, if not completely manipulated, the 
administrative process of the government. For example, in terms of the control over 
personnel, the CCP committees at each administrative level actually decided the 
appointment of personnel of the government at the next lower level. 
This complex administrative structure reflected the communists’ ambition in 
the 1950s to control all developments in the country from above. With the various 
party and government units, the state was trying to take change of every type of 
activity imaginable.  
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The CCP set up Xinjiang Uyghurs Autonomous Region and other lower level 
autonomous units in the 1950s to fulfill its promise to grant autonomy to the ethnic 
minorities residing in this region. XUAR enjoyed the same status as provinces in the 
political system and its administrative organs were similar to those of the provinces. 
The difference in this ethnic autonomous organ was that it should incorporate a 
certain number of minorities in the governmental posts. The chairman of XUAR was 
often a Uyghur. And Uyghurs also accounted for a considerable proportion in the 
autonomous government. The percentage of the Uyghurs in the XUAR government 
was slightly higher than that of the Uyghurs in the entire population of this region.  
But the autonomy that the Uyghurs enjoyed was virtually limited. In principle, 
the local autonomous government possessed some rights of self-government 
including the right to make some local regulations and laws, some flexible executive 
rights in the implementation of the policies and orders from the central government, a 
certain degree of autonomy in administering finances, and the right to organize public 
security forces. In effect, the omnipotent central government decided almost 
everything, leaving little discretion to the local government. To a great extent, the 
local governments were only executive organs of the state. In addition, the party 
system in China, in which the party set up branches and committees in governmental 
organizations and always exercised ultimate authority over its government 
counterpart, further restrained what little autonomy the XUAR enjoyed. In XUAR, 
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though the Uyghurs occupied quite a few seats in the governmental organizations, 
their existence in the party organization was only symbolic. The dominant position of 
Han Chinese in the party branch in Xinjiang never changed. Besides the fact that the 
Han Chinese constituted the absolute majority, the party’s secretary, who occupied 
the highest position in that area, was always taken by a Han Chinese. 
Thus, through this system, the central government was able to exercise firm 
control on the ethnical heterogeneous region and implement its grand economic plans 
smoothly. 
3.1.3 Social control in Mao’s era 
Command economy is a coherent system requiring excellent coordination of 
each department and exact information collection and analysis. However, the actual 
situation in China forbade the command economy to function in such a precise track. 
In the early 1950s, China was one of the poorest countries in the world. The share of 
engineers and technicians in the labor force was very low. These factors in 
conjunction with the large size and geographic heterogeneity of China constituted 
impediments for the smooth functioning of the command economy. For instance, the 
material balance planning required very precise calculations: the supply plans must be 
drawn up for each individual producer. Given that the producers differ, their material 
usage norm would differ, causing very complicated problems in the real calculation 
of the supply.  
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To ensure the operation of command economy and the control of the central 
government, the state had to resort to some crude blanket controls over the society.  
One was ideological indoctrination. The ideology instillation was often carried 
out by ideological propaganda through newspapers, radio and journals as well as by 
various campaigns. Campaigns such as Land Reform, Three Anti Five Anti, Thought 
Reform of Intellectuals, and so on, were initiated to propagate some broad themes—
fighting corruption, promoting agricultural collectivization, ferreting out those with 
‘rightist’ thoughts, etc. A notable theme was class and class struggle. Mao’s notion of 
class had left a deep imprint on the politics of the P. R. China. Mao initially embraced 
class analysis based on people’s relations to the means of production: in the 
countryside the basic productive resource was land and the two major confronting 
classes were the landlord and the peasant; in the urban areas, the two primary 
antagonistic classes were the proletarian and the bourgeoisie.80  From 1950 to 1952, 
Mao initiated a series of mass political campaigns including Land Reform, 
Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries, Thought Reform of Intellectuals, and Three 
Anti Five Anti to determine the class status of each urban and rural inhabitant. These 
campaigns were also preludes to the collectivization of agriculture and state’s 
takeover of the urban economy, both of which were completed by 1956. With private 
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property eliminated, Mao still remained cautious about the class struggle and 
addressed the issue of class identity in an un-Marxist fashion. He decided that 
political attitude could determine class status.81  
Even though ‘class’ almost completely lost its Marxist meaning in the CCP’s 
usage, the ideas of class and class struggle had been deeply implanted in the minds of 
people. People got used to using class term to brand themselves and others. The 
salience of class awareness had definitely eclipsed other forms of identity 
consciousness. Some old interviewees recalled that ‘people used to talk about their 
background as worker, peasant or intellectual etc; the ethnic line was not so clear as 
today.’82  This class-based classification of the society was a prominent feature in the 
Mao’s era. 
The emphasis put on ideological indoctrination also led to the repressive policy 
on the minority cultures, which had significant meanings for the Uyghurs’ collective 
protest. Mao’s creation of XUAR was merely a tactic without truly respecting the 
minority’ culture. 83 Though initially the authorities decided to introduce some mild 
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strategy to accommodate the minority culture, the radical campaigns that 
accompanied the ideological indoctrination turned the policy more suppressive. Every 
publication went through severe censorship. No private or civil cultural organizations 
were allowed to be established. In the case of the Uyghurs, two specific policies 
should be noted. First was the language policy. The Uyghur language belongs to the 
eastern or Altay branch of the Turkic family and is therefore related to Kazakh, 
Kyrgyz and Turkmen.84 This linguistic relationship gave Uyghurs a ready means of 
communication with their counterparts in Central Asia, which in the eyes of Mao, 
was a potentially unstable element. In addition, Mao believed that a common 
language is the base for the long-time unification of the country and the mutual 
improvement and development for all the peoples.85 Then a strategy to change the 
spelling of the Uyghur word was adopted to alienate the Uyghurs with their co-ethnic 
and co-linguistic neighbor. The Uyghur language was first written using an Arabic 
script. A ‘new script’ for Uyghur, based on a modified Latin alphabet was created in 
June 1958 to replace the old script. Uyghurs were encouraged to learn the Chinese 
language. Fluency in standard Chinese (mandarin) became a prerequisite for being an 
official cadre. Second was the tight control over religion. The overwhelmingly 
dominant religion of Uyghurs is Islam. How to accommodate religion, which stands 
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opposed to Marxist atheism, has always been a sensitive issue in the CCP’s minority 
policy. Though the CCP had devised the policy of ‘freedom in religious belief’ 
according to the Marxism principle, in reality, the launch of radical campaigns and 
the ensuing chaotic Cultural Revolution laid aside the policy. The stress on 
ideological indoctrination further limited the freedom of religious belief and activities. 
The religious reform campaign that accompanied Mao’s Great Leap Forward in 
Xinjiang was a serous effort of the CCP to dismantle the religious structures of the 
region.86 The campaign took on extreme forms in the latter stage, causing harsh 
punishment of religious personnel and huge damage to the religious temples and 
relics. The situation became even worse in the Cultural Revolution period.  
The detrimental consequence of cultural marginalization and religious 
persecution on the East Turkestan independent movement was not a provocative one, 
in which accentuated grievance worked to invoke the collective protest; but a 
disruptive result: The communication channel with the Central Asian states was 
effectively severed, making it hard for the Uyghurs to get support from their co-
linguistic neighbor countries. Islam, the guideline used for the East Turkestan 
movement, subjected to extremely strict restrictions and endless political 
indoctrination was utilized to weaken the influence of Islam in XUAR.  
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The second blanket control employed by the state was the control over 
population mobility. To maintain the state’s control over the enterprises, China 
exerted a very strict control over population mobility. Migration to cities by rural 
individuals was forbidden. Only a modest intake of rural workers into the urban 
industry was permitted through tightly restricted recruitment programs. In XUAR, 
two specific policies were adopted by the government: the massive immigration of 
Han Chinese, which was unique to Xinjiang, and the Household registration system, 
which was applied nationwide.   
The distinct demographic trait of Xinjiang made the government adopt the 
special migration policy.  Xinjiang has been a residence of many minority groups 
since ancient time. Estimates of its population before 1949 suggest that it was 
predominantly non-Han Chinese. ‘There was a survey carried out by the Xinjiang 
provincial police in 1940-1941, which estimated the total population at 3,730,000. 
Figures from the same period suggest that 3,439,000 of these were Muslim and that 
3,338,000 spoke either Uyghur, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uzbek or Tatar. These figures do 
not stand up independently to scrutiny in terms of modern surveys and statistical 
techniques but taken together, they indicate clearly that this was a region with only a 
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minority Han Chinese community in the early 1940s.’87 In the eyes of Mao Zedong, 
this minority-dominant demographic feature of this region was a highly possible 
source of instability.88 In order to ensure Beijing’s control and increase the border 
strength, Mao decided to transfer many Han Chinese into Xinjiang. A programme to 
encourage the immigration of Han Chinese from the east was announced in 1950. 
Table 3.1 Composition of Xinjiang’s population, 1949-1990 
Ethnic 
group 
1949 1964 1982 1986 1990 2000 
Uyghurs 
(no.) 
3,291,145 3,991,577 5,955,947 6,431,015 7,194,675 8,345,622 
Uyghurs 
(%) 
76.0 54.9 45.5 46.5 47.5 45.2 
Han (no.) 291,021 2,321,216 5,286,532 5,386,312 5,695,626 7,489,919 
Han (%) 6.7 31.9 40.4 38.9 37.6 40.6 
Kazaks 
(no.) 
443,655 489,261 903,335 1,010,543 1,106,989 1,245,023 
Kazaks 
(%) 
10.2 6.7 6.9 7.3 7.3 6.7 
Hui (no.) 122,501 264,017 570,789 611,816 681,527 839,837 
Hui (%) 2.8 3.6 4.4 4.4 4.5 4.5 
Others 
(no.) 
185,078 203,996 365,030 396,713 476,961 539,110 
Others (%) 4.3 2.8 2.8 2.9 3.2 2.9 
Total (no.) 4,333,400 7,270,067 13,081,633 13,836,399 15,155,778 18,459,511
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88 Kenneth Lieberthal, op.cit., p.80. 
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Source: Mackerras, China’s Minorities: Integration and Modernization in the 
Twentieth Century. (Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 253.  National census data of 
2000. 
 
From Table 3.1, we can see that the most significant demographic change in 
Xinjiang since the founding of the PRC has been the stark increase in the Han 
population. The percentage of Han population surged from 6.7 in 1949 to 40.4 in 
1982. Though the figure dropped slightly since 1982, the Han Chinese had become 
the second largest ethnic group in Xinjiang from then on. This growth was mainly 
due to the in-migration of Han, rather than natural increase. The immigration of Han 
Chinese into this area in Mao’s era was compulsory. Especially before 1966, the 
massive transferring of Han Chinese was a mandatory policy of the government.89  
An organization worth mentioning is the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps 
(XPCC)90, which was the main reception center for the compulsory immigration.  
The household registration policy was the other policy adopted to regulate the 
population.91 Household registration policy required every family and its members to 
have their identity recorded in the government files, which formed the basis for the 
                                                 
89 Mao Yongfu, ‘The Development Trend of the Ethnic Relationship in Xinjiang and a Probe on the 
Countermeasures’, Journal of Kashi Normal College, Vol. 17, No. 4, 1996, p.1. 
90 Before the early 1950s, the XPCC belonged to the People Liberation Army’s production and 
construction corps that was tasked with taking over and controlling outlying regions of the country. 
The force was reconstituted in 1954 as a civilian outfit with economic and quasi-military functions. Its 
primary tasks were land reclamation, agricultural production, infrastructure development of outlying 
border regions, and the maintenance of stability of these areas. 
91 The household registration policy is known as the ‘hukou’ policy in Chinese. 
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government to distribute food tickets to the residents. Only through the food tickets 
could the residents have access to some basic living goods such as food, sugar, and so 
forth. Thus, household registration was necessary for a family or a person to obtain 
basic subsistence. In addition, it was also necessary for access to employment and 
schooling, and for other economic benefits. Under the strict household registration 
policy, people were not allowed to move freely. To move to another place, one had to 
have sufficient reasons and had to go through a series of complex procedures. The 
rate of population movement at that time was very low. This meant that the Han 
Chinese that migrated to XUAR could not move elsewhere and had to remain in 
Xinjiang. 
The rigid and tight blanket controls had worked well in coordination with the 
command economy and largely made up for the limits brought about by the Chinese 
reality to the planned system.  
In all, in this command economy system, the regime had utilized an 
extraordinary array of controls to assert its dominance over the society. This formal 
control system did provide the state with unchallenged authority. Even the people’s 
social life was under the supervision and instruction of the state. The formal control 
system had kept a good record in restraining the East Turkestan independence 
movement. As depicted in the last chapter, the Uyghurs’ social disturbance had 
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shown a declining trend from 1950s to 1970s and in 1970s the collective protest was 
nearly invisible.  
However, despite significantly empowering the authority, the excessive and 
rigid control also led to severe problems that necessitated a fundamental 
transformation.   
3.2 Informal control in Deng’s era 
In 1978, after the collapse of ‘the Gang of Four’, Deng Xiaoping re-ascended to 
power in the central government. The problems embedded in the highly centralized 
control system became apparent and intolerable: low-efficiency, unwieldy 
bureaucracy, economic stagnation, social disorder and so on. Reform was urgently 
needed. With his determination to ‘seek truth from facts’, Deng initiated the reform 
momentum. ‘Surveying the crisis-ridden Chinese system in 1977 and 1978, Deng 
decided that only major reform would permit the CCP to remain in power.’ 92 The 
1980s period saw the transformation of command economy system into the market 
economy system in China, in which the paramount position of ideology in Mao era 
began to decline. The unanticipated success of economic reform further provided a 
boost for more radical reform in the political and social areas.  In the following two 
                                                 
92 Kenneth Lieberthal, op.cit., p.182. 
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decades, China underwent a state-rebuilding which was essentially a political 
transformation, which partly decentralized political power, energized and changed the 
ways the economy and society functioned. Though the reform followed a sometimes 
tortuous course93, the change was remarkably successful in some key areas.  
I argue that the state rebuilding essentially includes a systematic transition from 
the command economy to a qualitatively different economic system—market 
economy, a transition from a formal control model to an informal one. Virtually every 
aspect of Chinese economic policy was recast. Economic lever replaced the 
administrative instruction as the guideline in the economic field. The political system 
and social policies also underwent some corresponding changes. This section will not 
only provide a review of the major changes that occurred in this transformation, but 
also examine in depth the reasons why these fundamental changes are necessary. It 
aims to illustrate why it is necessary to change the old system as well as why it is 
advisable to convert to the new control system.  
                                                 
93 The process of reform was halted by the 1989 pro-democracy movement and conservative backlash 
thereafter. It was not until 1992, when Deng Xiaoping’s visited the metropolis in the Southern China, 
was the reform momentum renewed. Though the student movement in 1989 had halted the economic 
reform process and China’s new hardline leadership seemed determined to reverse many of the gains 
of economic reform, the leadership eventually realized that the economic changes were profound and 
virtually irreversible. 
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3.2.1 Command economy and market economy 
By the late 1970s, Chinese leaders had been grappling with the chronic 
economic problems for many years. There were several serious drawbacks associated 
with the command economy which required an overhaul. Firstly, enterprises lacked 
decision-making power and became simply appendages of state administrative 
agencies at different levels.  This situation had stifled the creativity and initiative of 
the enterprises. The daily routines of the enterprises were under rigid control by the 
state: enterprises did not have the right to sell products, and managers did not have 
right of decision-making in operation. The labor force was allocated by the state, and 
even wages were determined by the state. Moreover, the enterprises were required to 
report everything to the superior authorities, no matter they were large or small, and 
to await instructions from above. The whole economic sector was compounded by 
excessive administrative instructions. Secondly, in the traditional centralized system, 
the management of the economy was carried out through central and regional 
administrative systems, which might not be able to give practical, consistent and 
adaptable instructions to the enterprises. Lacking of concrete information and 
practical experience, the officials were unlikely to devise the most suitable policies 
for the enterprises within their limited time and finite energy. It was also difficult for 
the mandatory planning to cope with the complex and frequently changing demands 
of society. The lack of direct contact between the producers and the consumers 
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prevented the producers from knowing much about consumer needs.94 The prevailing 
problems such as inefficiency and goods shortage in the planned economic system 
were contradictory to the original will of setting up the planned system and stood in 
the way of the development of the country. Finally, in the command economy, there 
was no relationship between the profit of the enterprise and the quality of its 
operation, nor between the income of its employees and their efforts expended on the 
job. This situation was conductive to low efficiency and productivity. Workers and 
employers got the same wages according to their working age. Worse still, directors 
or employees were not accountable for the profits and losses of the enterprises. The 
same situation existed in the system of collective ownership of the rural people’s 
communes. The system of ‘eating from the same pot’ seriously stifled people’s 
initiatives and activeness.  
The poor performance of the command economy needed an overhaul of the 
whole system. A central characteristic of the Chinese development experience 
between the late 1950s and the late 1970s was a relatively slow growth of living 
standards, which was contradictory to the promise of socialism. The ‘new’ post 
Cultural Revolution leadership decided to abandon the previous command system, 
which was beset with deep-seated problems, and re-import the previous discarded 
                                                 
94 George Totten and Zhou Shulian ed., op.cit., p.4. 
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market mechanism to energize the economy95. From 1978, China began to undergo a 
dramatic transition from a planned economy to a market economy. 
The party’s reform policies were first carried out in the rural areas, and then 
spread to the cities. They brought four fundamental changes to the economic system. 
(1) Enterprises were no longer executive branches of the government, rather, they 
became independent entities. In the Mao era, enterprises were thoroughly controlled 
by government and lost their initiative and creativity. The first step to change the old 
system was to end the policy that all enterprise profits went to the government, and 
the higher levels of the government made all decisions for an enterprise. Then the 
‘director responsibility system was employed to further reduce interference in 
management by the party and government. A series of regulations and laws were also 
enacted and implemented to smooth the process of economic reform such as 
bankruptcy law and taxation system. ‘The enterprises were given the authority to 
make certain decisions, such as arranging production plans, utilizing retained funds, 
technological transformation, rewarding and penalizing staff members and workers, 
selling products in the markets and appointing or removing managers, thus bringing 
the economic benefits of the employees into a direct relationship with the output of 
                                                 
95 Though initially, the China’s leaders did try to re-construct the command economy, their efforts 
were soon driven to recast the whole system by the logic of economic circumstances.  
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the production and operation of the enterprises.’96 (2) The second significant change 
occurred in the ownership system. The public ownership established by Mao and his 
colleagues began to be dissolved. In rural areas in the early 1980s, farmers were given 
(or sold or rented) rights to use farmland. Land, as a vital means of production, 
became collectively owned (rather than State-owned) property, operated and managed 
mainly by individual farming households. The rural market was opened to facilitate 
the circulation of farm products and sideline products. Most importantly the 
agricultural production responsibility system spread widely, which helped to link 
farmers’ income with output. In urban and industrial areas, capital shares were being 
issued, to dilute the government monopoly of ownership.97 Private enterprise was 
allowed. By the end of 1986 there were thought to be almost 20 million self-
employed businessmen in China. 98  Though the proportion of private enterprises 
remained small compared to the state-owned enterprises in Xinjiang, its development 
was on an upward trend. Even though public ownership retained its dominant position, 
a structure of co-existence of diversified forms of ownership and diversified forms of 
operation was formed. (3) In the area of production and circulation, the functions of 
the market and the law of value replaced the state’s mandatory instructions. Rural free 
                                                 
96 George Totten and Zhou Shulian ed., op.cit., pp.6-7. 
97 Benedict Stavis, op.cit., p.43. 
98 Ibid. 
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markets were opened and various kinds of trade centers were established in the cities 
as well. (4) The rapid development of international trade was the fourth great change 
in the economical arena. China’s economic relationship with foreign countries 
changed from the former practice of ‘closing the country to international 
arrangements’ to a policy of ‘opening to the outside world’.99 Policies were made to 
encourage foreign businesses to invest in China and to establish joint enterprises. 
More important is that these joint enterprises were substantially outside the realm of 
direct government control.  
The economic reform was unanticipatedly successful. The rapid economic 
growth brought about by the economic reform further provided incentives for a 
corresponding transformation in the political as well as social arena.  
3.2.2 Political relaxation in the Post-Mao era 
The over-concentration of power in the Maoist system was a double-edged 
sword: while it had afforded the political leadership unchallenged control over the 
society and economy, it had also produced numerous problems of governance.100 First 
was the deterioration of political efficiency. The distinctive highly-centralized 
political system had developed numerous organizations to ensure strict party 
                                                 
99George Totten and Zhou Shulian ed ., op.cit., p.7. 
100Kenneth Lieberthal, op.cit., p.82. 
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discipline and total acceptance of the decision of the state. Thus the bulky and 
complex bureaucracy made the implementation of policies hardly efficient. More 
importantly, with the expanding economy and development of the society, demands 
on government for fast decisions on complex technological and economic issues 
increased. Secondly, the unclear line in the functions between the party and the 
government made the political system messy and awkward. In the Maoist system, the 
party’s image was tarnished by too much involvement in day-to-day affairs.101 Many 
reformers argued that a crucial first step in reform was to change the role of the CCP 
in the political and economic systems. Finally, mismanagement had further weakened 
the system and the legitimacy of the state. The decision-making power was firmly 
held in the hands of the top political leaders, who were not familiar with the local 
situation. They often made unitary policies and strategies to be implemented in 
different regions that varied in terms of economic development, environment 
situation, natural resources, and so on. It was most likely that their decisions were not 
practically applicable to some areas.  
These accumulative and intolerable problems in the political system seriously 
impeded the development of the market economy. The economic system was 
compounded by too-much involvement of the administrative force. Although the CCP 
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has never considered giving up its paramount position, necessary rectification should 
be made in the political system. This change was mainly a retreat of the political 
power from the economic field. 
The state took steps in three aspects: separation of party and government, 
decentralization, and restraining the role of government (1) Separation of party and 
government: According to Deng’s word, ‘The substance of reform should primarily 
be separating the party from government administration, finding a solution to how the 
party should exercise leadership, and how to improve leadership.’102 The separation 
of party and government became a main theme in the political reform. It led to the 
less interference of the party in the governmental affairs and the increasing 
administration power that the government enjoyed. The power of the party in the 
economic field was also substantially reduced. In the past, the party branch could 
actually decide everything for enterprises. The reform restricted the dominant role of 
the party and gave the director or factory manager complete authority to make 
decisions for enterprises. (2) Decentralization: It essentially was more delegation of 
power from higher levels to lower levels to generate more initiatives in the political 
structure. The central government confined its decision-making power to major 
affairs and only gave general outline or guidance instruction to the local government. 
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Local governments had more autonomy in dealing with local affairs: besides having 
more discretion in implementing the instruction from the central government, they 
could make some local policies, administrative laws, and regulations. (3) Restraining 
the role of government: This refers to granting more autonomy to the enterprises. 
Administrative means, the former most important factor in guiding the economy, 
gave ways to economic levers. The law of value and price information became major 
determinants of the economic activities. Enterprises could adjust their production 
according to the price information.  
However, the change in the political field was not as great as that in the 
economic field. The modification was modest: the party still held supreme power, and 
the hierarchical administrative structures were largely unchanged. The main 
amendment in the political area was the withdrawal of direct intervention of the 
administrative power in the enterprises’ activities. Furthermore, though the political 
relaxation did occur along with the economy reform, it was substantially curtailed 
after 1989. From this point, the informal control model of China should better be 
termed ‘selective informal control’: the unraveling of political control only happened 
in some aspects, while it was completely absent in other aspects. 
3.2.3 Social informal control 
With marketization in the economic arena and the mild relaxation in the 
political field, the crude social blanket controls became unsustainable. The tight and 
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rigid social controls were also unsuitable for the market economy. Thus, a similar 
policy shift toward relaxation also occurred in the social realm.  
First, the authority had loosened up the cultural policy. The repressive political 
indoctrination gradually diminished and eventually was abandoned because some 
ideas of Maoism conflicted with the market economy. The diversity of cultures was 
encouraged. The bans on the cultural activities and organizations were reduced. In 
1980, new conciliatory policies emphasized the need to respect minority nationality 
customs and guaranteed freedom of religious belief.  
The specific cultural policies in Xinjiang were correspondingly amended. There 
was greater recognition of the role of religion. Religious activities were allowed, if 
not promoted. Temples, Islamic buildings and religious clergies mushroomed in the 
new era. Till 1999 in XUAR, there were more than 23,900 officially authorized 
places for Islamic activities, and there were over 28,500 religious clergies whose 
position was equal to or above the rank of Imam.103 In terms of the language, the ‘old 
script’ of the Uyghur language reappeared publicly in 1978 and was formally 
authorized in 1980 for the printing of books and periodicals.104  
                                                 
103 Wang Shuanqian ed., Xinjiang Moving toward the 21 Century: Culture Volume (Xinjiang People’s 
Press, 1999),  p.281. 
104 Michael Dillon, op.cit, p.27. 
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The strategy to manipulate population mobility was also adjusted. As 
mentioned earlier, besides the requirement of the command economy, the high 
percentage of the Uyghur population in Xinjiang was viewed as an unstable factor. 
The compulsory massive migration of Han Chinese, with the ancillary means of 
household registration policy, was adopted to ensure the control of the state. However, 
the compulsory migration was difficult to sustain. Xinjiang was viewed as a place for 
exile in ancient China. The remoteness of this region and the divergent cultural 
environment added to the reasons for Han people not to want to stay here 
permanently. 1980 saw many Han Chinese allegedly attempting to return to China 
Proper, indicating their reluctance to stay in this region.105  The tight control on 
population began to unravel in the market economy era. With the marketisation of the 
commodity, household registration was no longer a necessity to get subsistence food 
and other economic benefits. The free movement of people became less constrained, 
if not completely unconstrained.  ‘Floating population’ appeared and increased 
remarkably. Thus, how to maintain the high portion of Han Chinese in Xinjiang re-
emerged as a problem. In the informal control model, the state adopted an indirect 
strategy to guide the population flow—that was, using the economic incentives. This 
strategy worked in accordance with the logic of market economy. By launching 
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grandeur projects in Xinjiang and permitting privileges, the government tried to 
design policy to attract qualified professional and technical staff from other parts of 
China to move to XUAR. This strategy was quite successful. There were quite a few 
workers coming to Xinjiang to look for jobs on either a temporary or permanent basis. 
‘Migrant farm workers are attracted by the opportunities for cotton picking during the 
harvesting season by traveling to Xinjiang during the autumn and returning home in 
early spring, although some stayed on to find permanent jobs as managers of cotton 
plantations. Some even accumulated enough capital to set up their own businesses as 
the money earned in a few months’ picking cotton can be the equivalent of several 
years’ income in their home villages.’106 
 
3.3 Conclusion 
In sum, the reform from a command economy to a market economy was a 
gradual process. In effect, China’s reform began not only without a blueprint on how 
to reform, but without even a sense of what the ultimate objective of reform would be. 
Only gradually, through the process of reforming, did the objective of reform become 
clear. The Chinese authority eventually chose to embrace the market economy. 
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The state-rebuilding from 1978 witnessed the decline of communist ideology 
and the rise of an interest-based social order. This transformation was a virtual shift 
from a repressive formal control system to a persuasive informal one.107 In society, 
many people were no longer forced to accept ideological indoctrination and became 
more interest-oriented.  
The advantages of informal control are apparent. Informal control is more 
effective and less money-consuming than formal control. By appealing to the instinct 
and the logic of the citizens, informal control allows the people to make their own 
decision. It educates people about the rationality, informs them of the surrounding 
circumstances, persuades them of what is the better choice, and discourages their 
incorrect behavior. It is unnecessary for the state to spend huge amount of money on 
coercive force and harsh punishment, and people are more willing to cooperate and 
coordinate with the government. In a command economy, the state has to make 
virtually every decision for the citizens, assigning tasks to them and forcing them to 
advance the collectivization process. Personal interest should always give way to the 
public good and political indoctrination was employed to raise their political 
consciousness. Most people could not act at their will. The function of this system 
depends on political suppression and exhaustive regulations. However, in the market 
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economy, economic levers are employed to guide the development of the economy. 
The profits provide incentives for the citizens to make their decisions and can be 
utilized by the state to lead the citizens. 
There are also political benefits in an interest-based social order. First, an 
interest-based social order is more governable than one based on non-interest factors 
such as belief and passion. It is obvious that the behavior of an individual who is 
interest oriented is more predictable than the act of a passion-guided person. 
Hirschman argues, ‘A world where people methodically pursue their private interest 
was… far more predicable, and hence more governable, than on where the citizens 
are vying with each other for honor and glory.’108 
Second, in an interest-oriented society, individual behavior is expected to be 
stable and continuous. Individuals pursue their own material benefits and follow their 
own rational calculation, so a turbulent change is highly unlikely to occur in their 
behaviors. Compared with formal control, in which people conform to the state 
because of fear and force, it is much less economic-consuming in the informal control 
society. Though in this society, the state makes less regulations and laws to guide 
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people’s behaviors, the behaviors are more predictable (people act according to their 
interest) and are more governable.  
Third, economic expansion can soften the regime’s use of coercion, thus it can 
sidestep several sensitive social problems related to control and help to integrate the 
minority regions. For example, the changing of the Uyghurs’ language script was 
severely criticized as an intentional means to dilute the ethnic culture and the 
requirement to learn Chinese was perceived as forced assimilation. Nevertheless, 
under the informal control, with the expansion of market economy, Uyghurs are 
willing to learn Chinese if they want to succeed economically. They come to realize 
that mastering mandarin is a necessity and offers a competitive edge if they want to 
grasp the economic opportunities and be upwardly mobile. 
Fourth, it is also hoped, the expansion of a market economy and the increase of 
commercial activities can facilitate interactions between the Han and Uyghur, 
establishing good relationship and enhancing mutual understanding. Furthermore, the 
individualist, rationalistic base of the market might undermine the religious support. 
Nevertheless state building is not an uncontested enterprise. Even though China 
remains an authoritarian state, the leadership could not rebuild the state at will. It 
might produce enormous unexpected consequences. The surge of social protests by 
the Uyghur activists forms a case in point. How state re-building has generated new 
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factors which lead to the surge of ethnic collective action will be sketched out in the 
next chapter.  
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Chapter 4 State-rebuilding and the Surge of Ethnic Social 
Movement 
The state re-building that occurred in the Post-Mao era is a strategic remedy to 
the old crisis-ridden political system. It aims at assuring the power of the state, 
maintaining and re-building the legitimacy of the CCP, and constructing a more 
governable society. However, this reform seems to have given life to an ethnic-based 
social movement which had laid relatively dormant for some time: the East Turkestan 
Independence Movement. From the historical records, we can see that after one 
decade of silence, the Uyghurs’ collective protest for autonomy and independence re-
emerged just three years after the reform started. Its re-emergence and development 
matches the trajectory of the reform so snugly109 that it behooves us to examine the 
relationship between the two: Is that just coincidental? Or is there some causal 
relationship between them? 
I argue that the resurgence of this ethnic-based social movement in the Post-
Mao era in China could be explained in the context of state rebuilding. This does not 
mean that the state intended to cause a rise in ethnic disturbance. Rather, the state 
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rebuilding sought to find a new effective method to strength the dominant power of 
the state over the society.  
Obviously, the State is not ‘an autonomous, irreducible set of institutions,’110 
but an ‘arena of routinized political competition in which class, status, and political 
conflicts, representing both elite and popular interests, are played out’.111 To elaborate 
this dynamic view of the state, it is necessary to quote the canon of Charles Bright 
and Susan Harding. ‘The state is autonomous in the sense that it is not reducible to 
economic and social struggles and is not causally dependent upon dominant social 
classes. The state is not autonomous in the sense of being self-contained or self-
directing, since it is continuously penetrated by social and economic struggles.’112 
State essentially is a part of society. Though institutions of governance and central 
agents of social order, states are internally divided and subject to penetration by 
conflicting and usually contradictory social forces.113 Endorsement of this dynamic 
view of the state will inevitably yield a similar dynamic perspective on state building. 
State building is not an unchallenged arena. It does not end once stately institutions 
emerge, but is continuous.  
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Even though China has been an authoritarian state with an organized 
hierarchical political system, the leadership could not rebuild the state at will. The 
process of state rebuilding might produce enormous unexpected consequences, some 
of which might be favorable for the social movement. ‘Each new policy initiative 
produced new channels of communication, more organized networks of citizens and 
more unified cognitive frameworks  around which insurgents could mount claims and 
organize’.114  
Before proceeding to explore the relationship between state building and social 
movement, it is worthwhile to spell out the analytic frameworks of the state building, 
political opportunity and social movement. The relation between social movements 
and the state is a crucial theme for understanding collective action.115 This approach 
is often called ‘political process’ approach, which focuses on the relationship between 
the political opportunity structure (POS) and the protest cycle. Within this approach, 
the POS is the most inclusive concept used to deal with the external, political 
conditions for protest.116  
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Here, I shall focus on the changing ‘political opportunity’ environment that was 
brought about by state rebuilding, as a key variable in explaining the re-emergence of 
the ethnic-based social movement. With the process of state rebuilding, the entire 
political system underwent dramatic changes which modify the environment of social 
actors sufficiently to influence the initiation, forms, and outcomes of collective action. 
In the second chapter, I have reviewed the rise and fall, retreat and revival of the East 
Turkestan Independence Movement in Xinjiang. In the third chapter, I have discussed 
the rationale and the primary changes in state rebuilding. In this chapter, I will 
explore the effect of the new political opportunity milieu on the social movement, 
especially the re-initiation of the East Turkestan Independence Movement. I will 
begin with a description of the changing trajectory of the two variables and then 
elaborate their causal relationship. In spelling out the connecting mechanism, I also 
attempt to connect the political opportunity, mobilizing structures, and framing 
processes. Though I will not look into the details of how social movement activists or 
organizations mobilize the mass and how they conduct the strategic framing, I will 
show how the political changes accompanying the state rebuilding facilitate the 
mobilizing and framing processes. 
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4.1.Re-emergence and Escalation—the Consequences of State 
Rebuilding 
As concluded in the previous chapter, the state rebuilding from 1978 contains a 
transformation from a formal control system to an informal control one, leading to a 
more open and liberal political environment. Social scientists have noticed the effects 
of policy changes on social movements. Scholars have argued that a reduction in 
repression facilitates the development of social movements.117 Skocpol argued that 
social revolutions are triggered by political crises, which weaken the political control 
and the state’s capacity for repression. McAdam also pointed out that diminishing 
repression was a facilitating factor. Donatella Della Porta gave a more subtle 
hypothesis after comparing the German and Italian cases. He indicated that a more 
tolerant and softer police behavior favors protest and a more repressive policing tend 
to discourage the mass and peaceful protest while at the same time fueling the more 
radical fringe.118  
The logic of their argument is also applicable to the case of East Turkestan 
Independence Movement with some caveats. First, the explanatory variable in my 
study cannot be reduced to the repression policy. The state rebuilding is a systematic 
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transformation. Driven by the demands of the market economy, the state rebuilding 
has adopted corresponding strategies in the political and social arenas. Many 
adjustments other than repression policy have affected the East Turkestan movement 
in Xinjiang. While some scholars tend to focus on the effect of a certain specific 
policy or event, I will examine the changes in the broad political opportunity 
environment. Second, the informal control of post-Mao era is better termed ‘selective 
informal control’. The reduction of authoritarian power in the central government is 
better described as political relaxation rather than political liberation. It mainly refers 
to the retreat of direct political involvement in economic affairs. However, governing 
power is still firmly in the hands of the CCP. Its firmly opposition to any collective 
protest events remains largely unchanged. Thus, it is no wonder that the repertoire of 
social movement in China is often violently monochromatic. The persistent illiberal 
political culture has pushed movements to adopt antagonistic and confrontational 
positions. The transformation from formal control system to selective informal 
control did not affect much the forms of protest, but greatly influenced the growth 
cycles of protest. That is also one primary reason why this study does not delve into 
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By way of summary, the most salient characteristics of state rebuilding and the 
development of East Turkestan Independence Movement are shown in the table 4.1. 
The state rebuilding efforts that aimed at securing the control of the state through 
taking up a more subtle and persuasive mechanism reversely resulted in the surge of 
ethnic social movements, which challenged the authority of the state. In general, the 
social movement shrank with the establishment of repressive and hard control system, 
whereas it revived and prospered along with the adoption of more open and tolerant 
policies in state rebuilding.  
However, the open and tolerant policies brought by state rebuilding do not 
necessarily lead to ethnic disturbances. Imagine this scenario: In the changed political 
environment, the social constraints become loosened and the emphasis was 
transferred to economic growth. People now enjoy a better living standard with a 
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much more gentle treatment by the state. Why would they still want to wage social 
insurgencies? And how can they persuade the masses to join in and sustain their 
collective action? It is an attempting fallacy of drawing the unwarranted chain of 
reasoning by simply showing the separate alterations within two variables. Hence, to 
show the flow of causal relationship between the state rebuilding and social 
movements, we need look in depth at the people’s actual situation: not only the 
opportunities available to them to act, but also their intentions for waging collective 
protests, as well as their capabilities in plotting, mobilizing and coordinating. To do 
so, this study endeavors to connect the political opportunity with the framing process 
and the mobilization structure. Nonetheless, due to the lack of micro-level 
information, the study would not explore the intensions and capabilities of any single 
organizations and key participants, nor would it analyze the structure of the 
organizations. Rather, it mainly aims to show what favorable conditions the political 
opportunity—the more open and tolerant political milieu—provided to the framing 
process and the mobilization. 
4.2 State Rebuilding and Ethnic Identity 
Framing process is an essential part of social movements to elicit support and 
consensus. The study would first examine the conductive effects of the state 
rebuilding on identity framing, one important dimension in the framing process.  
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The East Turkestan Independence Movement is a nationalist movement, in 
which the ethnic identity figures prominently. Ethnic identity functions as a unifying 
bonding for mobilizing people and gaining support for collective action. Once the 
person perceives himself as a member of the ethnic group, he or she is more willing 
to make commitment to the collective. But if a personal or political incident arising 
makes the person aware of a different identity, the loyalty that he or she attaches to 
the previous group may vanish. The multivalency and fluidity of individual identities 
is what forces the leaders to try to build loyalty and accumulate followers by 
constructing narratives of ethnic unfolding that purports common descent and cultural 
commonality.  
The feeling of being a Uyghur forms the emotional barrier to the Han Chinese, 
reinforces their unwillingness to surrender their autonomy to an alien group, and 
justifies their collective fight with a foreign nation. Thus, the ethnic identity occupied 
a vital position in the East Turkestan Independence Movement. Thus, the state 
rebuilding could contribute to the ethnic collective actions through facilitating 
identity framing. 
In addition the study would also examine the favorable conditions arising from 
state rebuilding on issue framing, which serves not only to agitate the discontents and 
substantiate their claim of disparity, but also to reinforce their awareness of their 
distinct ethnic identity. 
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In the following analysis, I will show how state rebuilding directly offered 
some political opportunity for the framing of Uyghur identity as well as indirectly 
caused some unexpected results favorable to issue framing.  
4.2.1The Open Political Space—Opportunities for the Alternative Frame 
In Mao’s formal control system, there was little space for other dogmas. The 
characteristic traits of dominant Communist ideology in the Mao’s era were 
intolerance towards other ideologies, and its obligatory and compulsory character for 
the population.119 Certain aspects of Communist symbols and clichés were deeply 
rooted in mass consciousness through constant political indoctrination and various 
campaigns. The most prominent one was the concept of class and class struggle: the 
society consists of two primary contradictory classes, and the development of the 
society depends on the restless class struggle, in which the advanced class defeats the 
backward class. People at that time got so used to the class-based classification that 
they tended to brand others according to their class status. Class delineation crossed 
rather than paralleled the ethnic line. Hence, the feeling of belonging to a certain class 
collective would inevitably weaken the awareness of ethnic identity. Ethno-
nationalism was overshadowed by ideological indoctrination. In addition, Mao was 
very suspicious about ethno-nationalism, claiming it was detrimental to the unity of 
                                                 
119 That was the common trait in all communist states. 
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the whole nation. The ideas of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism were especially 
criticized. Mao and his colleagues were trying to forge an image of united nation 
called ‘Zhonghua Minzu’ 120 , which includes all 56 ethnic groups in China. The 
common traits among these groups should be emphasized while the distinct 
characters should be downplayed to preserve unity. Hence, though in principle, the 
minority cultural and religious activities should be respected, in reality, they were 
gravely restricted. Even worse, with the radicalization of the campaigns such as Four 
Clean-ups Movement, religious reform and Cultural Revolution, the Uyghurs’ culture 
and religion was suppressed. Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism, the ideological 
template of the East Turkestan Independence Movement, was severely curtailed, if 
not entirely eliminated. The identity framing project hence suffered a great deal. It 
was no wonder why the ethnic movements shrank so rapidly.  
This situation changed following Deng’s reform policy. Firstly, the paramount 
position of communist ideology weakened. In the state rebuilding that happened from 
1978, the market economy mechanism was re-employed by the CCP to replace the 
command economy system. Various ownerships and even a certain degree of 
exploitation were allowed. These were contradictory to the Mao’s imagination of the 
prototype of communism society or socialism society. At the initial stage of economic 
                                                 
120 In English it means ‘the Chinese nation’. 
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reform, there was a heated argument about the nature of the reform. Because of the 
previous political indoctrination, people were preoccupied with the contradiction 
between socialism and capitalism. The ‘decadent’ traits of capitalism including 
market economy were thought to be incompatible with socialism. This kind of 
thought was popular among the citizens as well as the cadres, leading them to cast 
doubts on the possibility of coexistence of market economy and socialism and further 
on the nature of the reform. Having realized that the continuation of ideological 
indoctrination would hinder reform, Deng proposed to lay aside the dispute on 
ideology and concentrate on accelerating economic growth. Later, his famous 
pragmatic argument that ‘Whether black or white, a cat is a good cat so long as it 
catches mice’ signaled both the ultimate triumph of economy over ideology, and the 
demise of the Maoism political indoctrination. Limited as it is, this relaxation on 
ideology control connoted the widen space for other thoughts and ideologies. It was 
the prerequisite and first step for the surge of Uyghurs’ ethno-nationalism. Because of 
the open space for alternative political discourse, Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism, 
though still banned officially, could capitalize on this opportunity through unofficial 
propagations. Secondly, the demise of the Maoism instillation freed people from the 
brand of ‘class’. ‘Class’ is essentially an artificial concept. Though ethno-nationalism 
is also ‘imagined’, it helps the members to imagine that they have a common ancestor 
and have a blood relation. Hence it holds a more natural and stronger bonding power 
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than class. That ethno-nationalism led to the dissolution of Soviet Union is a good 
example to demonstrate the appeal of ethno-nationalism over class identity. In the 
absence of imposing concepts of ‘class’ and ‘class struggle’, ethno-nationalism would 
more easily elicit advocators and supporters. Thirdly, minority culture and religion re-
gained respect after the Cultural Revolution, leading to a blossoming of ethnic 
cultural works and religious activities. Various cultural associations in XUAR 
including Authors’ Association, Playwrights’ Association, Artists’ Association, 
Dancers’ Association, Movie Association and Photographers’ Association were 
restored since 1978. Literacy and artistic creations were encouraged. The number of 
publishing house also increased, while the censorship became less strict. The more 
open and tolerant attitude toward minority culture and religion caused a proliferation 
in the cultural works of the minority group. This doubtlessly provided convenience to 
the circulation of ethno-nationalism, facilitating the identity framing. A notable case 
was the so-called ‘three books’. Around 1990, a celebrated Uyghur writer Turghun 
Almas published his three academic books: ‘the Uyghurs’, ‘A Brief history of the 
Xiongnu’ and ‘Ancient Uyghur Literature’. In these books, the author tried to 
demonstrate that Xinjiang has not, as official Chinese historiography maintains, been 
an integral part of China since the Han dynasty, and that the Uyghurs are culturally 
and ethnically related to other Turkic peoples outside China. Though they were 
banned and scolded because of the Pan-Turkic sentiments, these books were widely 
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circulated in Xinjiang and that people seized on them ‘as if they had discovered a 
treasure’.121 Young students in particular were desperate to pass them around. Besides, 
the officials began to encourage the ethnoregional celebrations and give special 
permissiveness to religious rituals. The tolerance or even encouragement of religion 
has further increased the centrifugal force as Islam acts as one major ethnic identifier 
and apparently stands opposite to the atheism believed by most Han Chinese. A Hong 
Kong newspaper commented in 1995: ‘Some local personalities say that in Mao 
Zedong’s era, there was tight control over religious belief, so national secessionism 
was well under control; in recent years, however, because the authorities have 
adopted a relaxed policy towards religious belief, the instigators have often conducted 
secessionist activities in the name of religion.’122 
4.2.2 Special Treatment and Widening Inequality 
Though the awareness of the distinct ethnic identity is crucial for group 
unification and consensus, it is not sufficient for action mobilization. Other 
dimensions of framing such as issue framing and strategy framing are needed to 
further agitate the discontents and ethno-nationalism feelings. To persuade the people 
to take collective confrontational action toward the government, the activists or social 
                                                 
121 Xu Yuqi, History of the Struggle against Ethnic Separatism in Xinjiang (Xinjiang People’s Press in 
Urumqi, 1999), p.116. 
122 Lien ho pao, October 11, 1995. 
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movement organizations have to pick up problems, themes, and symbols that resonate 
with the potential supporter. 
It is true that in pursuit of mass support, the activists or social movement 
organizations could use intentionally distorted information or apply different 
meanings to the same events. Nevertheless, they could not revise the history or make 
fabrication as they please. More importantly, too much fake information would 
decrease the convincing power of their framing and damage their reputation. Thus, 
interpreting some widely acknowledged information from a different perspective 
would be more rewarding than just fabricating. The framing would be more 
successful with the aid of some favorable factual conditions.  
In the following part, I would show that the reform has caused some 
unintentional results, which could be utilized for framing by the activists or social 
movement organizations to build up their union. 
4.2.2.1 Different treatment--the preferential policies 
In the reform area, economic growth has replaced the political struggle to 
become the top priority in the state agenda. The state also put great emphasis on the 
development of minority regions. These minority residential regions were mostly 
located in the peripheral areas of China with difficult access and, due to both natural 
and historical factors, were markedly poorer than those inhabited by Han. In the case 
of Xinjiang, it is famous for being the most remote place from the sea. It is also 
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notable for its oasis agriculture in a vast desert, the chronic shortage of water, and 
dramatic and dangerous weather conditions. All these factors have led to the 
economic subordination of Xinjiang.  
Chinese leaders do recognize the need to promote the economy of minorities to 
reinforce the legitimacy of the regime. Article 122 of the PRC Constitution proclaims 
that: ‘The state gives financial, material and technical assistance to the minority 
nationalities to accelerate their economic and cultural development.’123 Preferential 
policies have been made since 1950s. However, in the Mao’s era, the radical 
campaigns and emphasis on class struggle had laid aside the special treatment policy 
toward the minorities. It was not until the mid-1980s that preferential policies were 
seriously touted in practice as a way to close China’s ethnic gap in living standards 
and education.124 
The scope of preferences is quite wide. Three major dimensions of affirmative 
action cover economic subsidies, preferential educational policies, and hiring and 
promotion of minorities. 
                                                 
123 PRC Constitution. 
124 Barry Sautman, op.cit., p.87. 
  100
Xinjiang has always obtained a substantial state subsidy in its development 
project. Besides the ‘Ethnic Region Subsidies’125, and the ‘Flexible Ethnic Region 
Fund’ 126 , the state has provided a lot of investments to the pillar industries of 
Xinjiang such as oil, cotton and minerals. The central government has also allocated a 
huge amount of subsidies on infrastructure construction projects in Xinjiang to bolster 
economic development. 
The preferential educational policies include larger budgets, more lenient 
standards of admission to universities, and tuition waivers. The Ethnic Minorities 
Education Aid Special Fund (shaoshu minzu jiaoyu buzhu zhuankuan), Project Hope 
(xiwang gongcheng) and the Border Areas Construction Aid Fund (bianjing diqu 
jianshe buzhu fei) are state funds aimed at promoting the education level of minorities 
in Xinjiang.127 The minority enrolment to schools is encouraged. For example, there 
are hundreds of boarding schools in minority pastoral areas of Xinjiang that give 
boarders ‘two exemptions’ from payment for tuition and books, or ‘four guarantees’ 
of free food, clothing, lodging, and study materials. Furthermore, lower admission 
standards are applicable to the minorities. Minority students with lower entrance 
examination scores are eligible to enter colleges and universities. When a minority 
                                                 
125 It was set up in 1955. 
126 It was set up in 1964. 
127 Barry Sautman, op.cit, p.90. 
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student has grades at the same level as a Han student, the former is to be given first 
consideration for enrollment. 
The policies about hiring and promotion of minorities have not varied much 
with the Mao’s policies. Mao once stated that the solution to the ‘nationalities 
problem’ lay in training large numbers of minority cadres.128 Minorities are often 
overrepresented in autonomous areas. The Chairman of XUAR has always been a 
Uyghur, and the top-ranking Uyghur officials in the government account for a higher 
percentage than the proportion of Uyghurs in the provincial population. The concept 
of giving preference to minorities to fill state leadership positions in autonomies was 
further extended in 1994 below the county level.129 
State’s re-concentration on economy stripped the Uyghur from egalitarianism. 
The abandonment of egalitarian policies and actual implementation of affirmative 
action have had a profound influence on the Uyghurs’ awareness of ethnic identity. 
Preferential policy with the connotation of treating differently has provided an 
instrumental reason for the affirmation of ethnic minority identity. A considerable 
number of people have re-identified themselves as members of minorities in PRC in 
                                                 
128 Ibid., p.94. 
129 Ibid. 
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response to a variety of benefits derived from affirmative action. 130  It has also 
inspired the Uyghurs to reflect on their ethnic identity. It has not completely achieved 
the expected result of gaining support, rather, it has made Uyghurs feel that the state 
has deliberately treated them differently because of their so-called ‘backwardness’. 
Hence, the preferential policy with its purpose of enhancing the legitimacy of the 
regime and reducing separatist sentiments has conversely accentuated the awareness 
of their distinct ethnic identity. 
4.2.2.2 Inequality—the unsatisfactory effect of preferential policies 
Apparently, to build up legitimacy and maintain social stability, the central 
government has made serious efforts to achieve equality among groups. Substantial 
preferential policies have been adopted by the government to change the economic 
subordination situation in the minority region. Nevertheless, the gap between most 
minorities and the Han remains substantial. Despite the privileges granted to the 
Uyghur, the gap between Han and Uyghurs broadened rather than narrowed. The 
following two tables show the differences in the income and occupational patterns 
between Han and Uyghurs in XUAR. 
 
 
                                                 
130 William Safran ed., op.cit., p.3. 
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Table 4.2 Income Level in Xinjiang by Ethnicity: 1982, 1990, and 2000 
Ethnic group 
Per capita family 
income 1982 
(Yuan) 
Per capita family 
income 1990 
(Yuan) 
Per capita family 
income 2000 
(Yuan) 
Uyghur 194 398 697 
Han 235 516 824 
Source: 1982, 1990 and 2000 national census data (National Bureau of Statistics, 
PRC). 
Table 4.3 Employment Patterns in Xinjiang by Ethnicity, 1982, 1990 and 2000 (%) 
 Technicians Government officials Office clerks 
Ethnic 
Group 
1982 1990 2000 1982 1990 2000 1982 1990 2000
Uyghur 4.2 4.1 5.3 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.9 
Han 12.4 12.4 11.1 3.9 4.5 4.0 3.6 4.5 6.1 
 Business persons and 
workers in service 
industry 
Agriculture, pastoral, 




1982 1990 2000 1982 1990 2000 1982 1990 2000
Uyghur 2.8 3.6 5.4 84.0 84.1 80.5 7.1 6.1 5.8 
Han 7.2 9.1 17.2 38.2 38.1 36.8 34.5 31.2 24.7 
 Others 
Ethnic Group 1982 1990 2000 
Uyghur 0.0 0.0 0.3 
Han 0.1 0.2 0.1 
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Source: quoted from Ma Rong ‘Population Distribution and Relations among Ethnic 
Groups in the Kashgar Region, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region’, in ‘China’s 
Minorities on the Move: Selected Case Studies’, Robyn Iredale, ed. pp.106-122., and 
China Statistics Yearbook 2003.  
Table 4.2 has documented the per capital family income of the Uyghur and Han 
Chinese in XUAR in the three national censuses. Even though Xinjiang as a whole 
has a modest record on the rural-urban income disparity, the income gap between Han 
Chinese and Uyghurs of Xinjiang is large. The absolute difference in the family 
income between the two ethnic groups has increased. The difference not only exists 
actually, but also has been keenly felt by the Uyghur. In my field work, when 
addressing the question ‘do you think there is an income difference between the 
Uyghur and Han or not?’, the response has often been a definite positive answer or a 
decisive nod of head. Though they cited various reasons for the difference such as the 
historical backwardness, the lazy habit of the Uyghur, and relatively large family 
population of the Uyghur, they are clearly aware of their perpetual subordinate 
economic position. Moreover, the existing economy structure strongly favors Han 
Chinese, who fill approximately four fifths of all jobs in manufacturing, the oil and 
gas industries, transport, communications, and science and technology, and fully 
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nine-tenths of jobs in the burgeoning field of construction.131 This situation makes 
Uyghurs’ future prospects gloomier. 
Table 4.3 shows the employment patterns of these two ethnic groups. Most of 
the Han living in Xinjiang are mainly engaged in commerce, handicrafts, and in more 
recent years, modern industry, while the Uyghur are overrepresented in agriculture. 
Whereas Uyghurs’ representation has increased slightly in office clerks, business 
persons and service workers, little change has occurred in other occupational 
categories. The administrative offices and industrial enterprises are mostly 
represented by the Han people. This occupational stratification between the two 
groups, though might not result from a deliberate racial discrimination policy, has in 
effect formed a ‘cultural division of labor’ in Michael Hechter’s term. ‘Cultural 
division of labor’ is ‘a system of stratification where objective cultural distinctions 
are super-imposed upon class line. High status occupations tend to be reserved for 
those of metropolitan culture; while those of indigenous culture cluster at the bottom 
of the stratification system.’132 This uneven economic development in the region, 
especially the unequal distribution of the occupation, might lead the minority people 
to feel ‘relatively deprived’. It provides an incentive for these people to become 
                                                 
131 Graham E. Fuller and S. Frederick Starr, ‘The Xinjiang Problem’ (available from website 
http://www.cornellcaspian.com/pub2/xinjiang_final.pdf, (Oct. 20, 2004), p.18. 
132 Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism: the Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-
1966, (University of California Press, 1975), p.30. 
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politically restless. ‘Where people think of themselves in ethnic or social-national 
terms, and inhabit a territory which is differentiated on economic grounds from other 
such groups, then there is a high probability that nationalism will develop, given 
favorable political and cultural conditions.’ 133  The actual existence of the 
occupational inequality surely contributes to the framing of the opposition image 
between the subordinate group and the dominant group. 
The growing Uyghurs’ perceptions of socio-economic inequalities between Han 
Chinese and the Uyghur in Xinjiang lie at the root of their discontent and grievance. 
In the view of many Uyghurs, the unequal development would lead to their own 
ultimate displacement. Their feelings of disparity might be utilized to facilitate the 
framing process and agitate the disturbance. 
4.2.2.3 Competition increasing--the natural result of market economy 
In the market economy, the economic leverage is employed as the main 
measure to guide and coordinate the economic activities, which were mainly 
manipulated by compulsory administrative orders in the Maoist system. Competition, 
as a distinct feature of the market economy, has increased dramatically, bringing not 
only dynamics to the economy but also threats to the traditional Uyghur people. 
                                                 
133 James G Kellas, The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity, (Macmillan Education Ltd, 1991), p.62 
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Most Uyghurs that I interviewed in my fieldwork have mentioned two key 
threats. One threat is posed by the floating population. As argued in the last Chapter, 
the population policy has also changed from the restrictive one to a more tolerable 
one toward population movement. To maintain the ratio of Han population in XUAR, 
the government has resorted to economic incentives: by granting privileges to the 
investors and the technical staffs, and establishing state-subsidized projects of 
development. Since 1978, spontaneous in-migrants to Xinjiang have increased. It 
further expanded in the 1980s and grew even more in the 1990s. In the six years from 
1985 to 1990, the number of inter-provincial in-migrants was 345,365 and from 1990 
to 1995 it was one million.134 Nearly all in-migrants were Han, moving mostly from 
Sichuan, Henan, Zhejiang, Jiangsu and Gansu. Though there was only a low ratio of 
Han in-migrants who obtained local hukou (household registration) in Xinjiang, a 
large number of these in-migrants would remain in Xinjiang for a long time because 
they migrated with ‘specific goals for living and business’.135 Whereas earlier the 
XPCC concentrated its work in a few relatively isolated locales, the new settlers were 
entering all of the larger cities and, significantly, the great southern oases that form 
the Uyghur heartland. Many Uyghur interviewees complained that these floating 
                                                 
134 Robyn Iredale, Naran Bilik, and Wang Su ed., Contemporary Minority Migration, Education, and 
Ethnicity in China.(Cheltenham, UK ; Northampton, MA : Edward Elgar, 2001), p.175. 
135 Ibid. 
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Hans were displacing them in jobs and brought some serious social problems to 
XUAR. The in-migration was and is slowly denying to Uyghurs the traditional 
centers of their civilization. The capital of Xinjiang, Urumqi, now is a Han-dominant 
town with an absolute majority of 77% Han people.136 In addition, the advent of Han 
in the great oasis cities and especially their penetration into oasis agricultural areas 
would, in the eyes of Uyghurs, have a cataclysmic impact on the survival of cultures 
as well as the very existence of the Uyghur. 
The other threat lies in shrinking job opportunities. With the marketization of 
the economy, the state no longer assigned job to graduates. They have to find their 
job through highly competitive process. Meanwhile, the enterprises and the 
companies are granted more autonomy in personnel arrangement, and they tend to 
hire Han rather than Uyghur, all things being equal. Actually, the Uyghur students are 
at a very disadvantaged position in job-hunting. Šőhrat, one Uyghur academics, ‘once 
described how the 1993 Forum for Talent Exchange (Rencai Jiaoliuhui) held in 
Urumqi had been cancelled halfway through after Han company representatives were 
accused of intending to employ only Han Chinese or Uyghurs whose first language 
was Chinese. The authorities allegedly shut the forum down after students from 
                                                 
136 Population Census Office of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region ed., Tabulation on the 2000 
Population Census of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (Xinjiang People’s Press, 2002), p. 100. 
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Xinjiang University threatened to march in protest.’137 Some Uyghur students told me 
that when they were attending some similar forums, they also encountered 
discrimination. There were few company stalls that had their details advertised in 
Uyghur script. One interviewee even mentioned an annoying experience: when he 
approached a medicine firm and offered his resume, the representative of the firm 
replied: ‘We do not consider Uyghurs’.  
These competitions have contributed to the framing process. The feeling of 
being threatened by another group leads to a clear awareness of the demarcation 
between ‘they’ and ‘we’. Members of the increasingly disadvantaged group normally 
react with resentment and a sharpened sense of communal identity and common 
interest.  
The impressions of unequal situations between the two ethnic groups could be 
used by the activists in their pursuit of mass support and action. More and more 
Uyghurs sense that the new opportunities created by the reform benefit mainly Han, 
who are increasingly shouldering them to the sidelines. The Uyghurs essentially 
regard development, especially the economic development of Xinjiang as a zero-sum 
game, in which they are not only the losers but will, by losing, also forfeit their 
                                                 
137 Joanne Smith, ‘Four Generations of Uyghurs: The Shift towards Ethno-political Ideologies among 
Xinjiang’s Youth’, Inner Asia, Vol. 2, No.2, 2000, p.210. 
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culture and homeland and even their very existence as a distinct people.138 Thus, the 
employment of market economy by the state with the purpose of gaining support 
through the economic development has instead magnified the tensions. 
4.2.3 State rebuilding and mobilization 
We should note that neither grievance nor the indignation to which the Pan-
Islamism and Pan-Turkism appeal suffices to set up collective actions. As James 
Scott rightly remarks, if anger at exploitation and injustice were enough to spark 
rebellion; the Third world would be in flames.139 A key point is whether the group 
with a grievance possesses a certain capability to act on it. The displaced and 
disfranchised groups are unlikely to be representatives in the census of popular 
activism because these people often have meager resources to fight with. To 
orchestrate discontent and convert it into collective action, the activists must hold 
adequate resources and possess certain capabilities. Economic basis, organizational 
networks and political connections are the primary resources that afford them the 
capability to press their claims in the political area, the capability of mobilization. 
State rebuilding, with its influential result of changing the broad political milieu, 
is central in shaping the available resources of mobilization. In this section, I will 
                                                 
138 Graham E. Fuller and S. Frederick Starr, op.cit., p.7. 
139 James C. Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant (Yale University Press, 1976), p.4. 
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show that the state rebuilding not only provides material resources and potential allies 
to the social movement but also opens space for the formation of social movement 
organization. It has a profound influence on the Uyghur activists’ capability of 
mobilization. 
4.2.3.1 Material resources 
The emphasis put on the economic growth and the employment of market 
economy inevitably leads to modernization and privatization, which have as a 
consequence of facilitating and enriching the social movement, in this case, the East 
Turkestan Independence Movement.  
One most significant result arising from the modernization process is the 
improvement of transportation and communication condition. Xinjiang had been 
noted for its difficult access. The vast deserts and steep mountains had discouraged 
external as well as internal contacts and communication. In Justin Jon Rudelson’s 
description, the Uyghur people tended to live in the isolated oases in the desert, oases 
that had few contacts between each other.140  The geographical and social boundaries 
of the residence of Uyghur people shaped the ethnic identities at the local oasis and 
regional levels. They also constrained the formation of a pan-Uyghur identity because 
                                                 
140 Justin Jon Rudelson, op.cit. 
  112
the Uyghur people tended to be more sentimentally tied to the oases identity.141 
Besides, the poor transportation conditions and lack of communication facilities 
raised the cost of collective action: resources were more difficult to collect and 
distribute; circulation of information took a long time; outside supporters were 
inaccessible; large-scale and sustainable actions were extremely hard to plot and 
coordinate, let alone retreat and evacuate. These constrains greatly reduced the 
possibility of success of collective action, discouraging potential activists and 
followers. However, in the reform era, it is a pressing requirement to upgrade the 
fundamental equipment: highway, railway, airport, telephone, Internet and other 
infrastructure constructions. In order to create a competitive national economy, the 
state has put massive investment into infrastructure projects in Xinjiang. 
Transportation and communication networks have been constructed at a torrent pace 
to permit an ease of capital transfer within and beyond the PRC.142 The development 
of transportation and communication have not only contributed to a formation of Pan-
Uyghur identity but also reduced the cost of mobilization: resources became easier to 
amass and allocate; circulation of information could be done within several minutes; 
outside supporters could be more easily reached; the plot and coordination of the 
collective actions were facilitated by the advanced equipments. 
                                                 
141 Ibid. 
142 Scott Fogden, op.cit., p.36. 
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Economic growth and privatization have also benefited mobilization. The 
economic development determines the level of resources generally available to the 
social movement. The economic system is another influential factor in resource 
aggregation. In the Maoist system, the economic development was relatively 
backward because of the exhausting result of the long-time wars. The resources were 
barely sufficient for subsistence consumption, and were seriously inadequate in some 
years because of natural calamities and inappropriate administration. There was no 
extra material resource left to the Uyghur people to wage collective actions. However, 
with the marketization in the post-Mao era, the rapid economic development in 
Xinjiang created sufficient wealth to lift the per capita income there as could be seen 
from the Table 4.2. Although it does not mean that all the Uyghur people would 
definitely put their spare resources into the social movement, the existence of extra 
materials is one of the crucial economic preconditions for nurturing a collective 
action. The privatization further provides more opportunity for the social movement. 
The re-employment of private ownership has allowed the people more freedom to 
deal with their personal property. 
4.2.3.2 Building blocks and allies 
Social movement organizations (SMOs) constitute crucial building blocks of 
the mobilizing structures of a social movement. Other mobilizing structures including 
kinship and friendship networks, informal networks among activists, movement 
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communities, as well as a host of more formal organizations which contribute to the 
movement’s cause without being directly engaged in the process of mobilization for 
collective action. 143  In the formal and firm control under Maoist system, the 
organizations could hardly find space to grow. A notable case is the East Turkestan 
Peoples’ Revolutionary Party, which was alleged to be the most influential SMO at 
that time. It was soon targeted and eradicated by the state before it could wage a 
large-scale collective action. In the reform era, the state began to loosen up its tight 
control and resorted to a more subtle mechanism to control the region, which 
paradoxically has provided opportunity for these organizations to develop.  
The relaxation of formal control has opened space for the formation of SMOs 
for the East Turkestan Independence Movement. SMOs are those organizations that 
try to mobilize their constituency for collective action with a clear political goal. In 
this case, they mobilize people to support and join in their defiance action toward the 
Chinese authority in pursuit of independence of East Turkestan or true autonomy. 
Although overt opposition action was never allowed by the CCP, the East Turkestan 
Independence Movement Organizations could be set up and maintained under the 
ground in a more open system. These clandestine organizations apparently have made 
full use of the opportunity of state rebuilding to develop and expand. There are a 
                                                 
143 Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, op.cit., p.152. 
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number of organized groups of Uyghur identified by the state as Uyghur terrorist 
organizations. The following table summarized a report compiled by the U.S. State 
Department about the Uyghur insurgent elements. 
Table 4.4 Insurgent Groups Relative to the East Turkestan Independence Movement 
Insurgent Groups 
United Revolutionary Front of Eastern 
Turkestan 
Leader: Yusupbek Mukhlisi (aks Modan 
Mukhlisi) 
•Thirty armed units, including expert 
bomb makers 
•Mukhlisi boasts of having ‘twenty-two 
million Uyghurs’ ready to conduct armed 
struggle against the PRC 
•Claims to have ties to several groups 
across the border of Kazakhstan 
Xinjiang Liberation Organization and 
Uyghur Liberation Organization (ULO) 
Leader: (Not listed) 
•Reportedly responsible for 
assassinations of Uyghurs viewed as 
‘collaborators’ with the PRC and Central 
Asian governments. 
•Dispersed throughout the region: in 
Tajikistan, China, Uzbekistan, 
Afghanistan, and the Russian Republic of 
Chechnya 
Wolves of Lop Nor 
•Claimed responsibility for a number of 
train bombings and for several 
assassinations. 
•Home city of Lop Nor is the site of one 
of China’s largest nuclear test sites. 
Free Turkistan Movement 
Leader: Abdul Kasim 
•Led April 1990 uprising in Baren, 
Xinjiang. PRC officials report 22 people 
were killed. 
•Weapons used in the Baren uprising may 
have come from Afghan Mujahadeen. 
Home of East Turkistan Youth 
Leader: (Not listed). 
•Branded as Xinjiang’s Hamas. 
•Reports 2, 000 members; may have 
undergone explosives training in camps 
inside Afghanistan 
Organization for the Liberation of 
Uyghuristan 
Leader: Ashir Vakhidi 
•Committed to armed struggle against 
Chinese ‘occupation’ of the ‘Uyghur 
homeland’. 
Source: Scott Forgden, ‘Writing Insecurity: The PRC’s Push to Modernize China and 




Though the list by no means includes all the East Turkestan Independence 
Movement Organizations, these representative groups show the scale of the SMOs in 
the reform era. It is arguable that some of these groups might originate from some 
clandestine organizations that have remained underground in Mao’s era, nevertheless, 
it is safe to say that compared with the formal control system, the informal control 
system has helped to proliferate the SMOs.  
The reform also has affected the social networks and some supportive 
organizations. In the pre-reform era, people were assigned jobs by the state. People’s 
social networks at that time were largely confined to their working circumstance: that 
was, in rural, the production teams; in urban, the working units. The dominant 
ideology about class and class struggle further confined the social contact of people. 
The ethnic line was not so prominent at that time. The reform not only brought the 
freedom of personnel system of the companies and enterprises, but also terminated 
the collectivization program in the rural places. People had more freedom in choosing 
their career, and more freedom in deciding their social networks. The feeling of 
belonging to a certain ethnic group certainly plays a great role in the Uyghurs’ social 
contact.144 It is natural for them to make friends with members of their own group 
rather than with members of an alien group. With the exception of practical 
                                                 
144 Some informants born in 1940s and 1950s recalled that during their childhoods, they had some 
good Han Chinese playmates. It shows that ethnic segregations were not serious in Mao’s era. 
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relationships formed within the work environment, Uyghurs do not willingly mix 
with Han Chinese. The ethnic segregation in Xinjiang provides favorable conditions 
for the mobilization of East Turkestan Independence Movement.  
The reformist cultural policy has encouraged the growth of supportive 
organizations. The religion freedom policy was re-emphasized in the reformist era, 
leading to the relaxation of control over religious activities. The force of religion 
began to expand rapidly. Temples were constructed, Imams were trained to propagate 
Koran, and various religious festivals were celebrated. Islamic fanaticism has 
occurred in many places in Xinjiang and especially prevailed in the southern part of 
Xinjiang.145 Private Koran schools proliferated from the beginning of 1980s, though 
claimed illegal by the government.146 The Islamic temples, the private Koran schools 
as well as the increasing publish houses I mentioned before could be so-called 
supportive organizations in the East Turkestan Independence Movement. These 
supportive organizations could contribute to the social organization of the 
constituency of a given movement without directly taking part in the mobilization for 
collective action.147 These organizations could also be used by the SMOs to advocate 
their aspiration and assist the mobilization. The insurgence happened in Baren village 
                                                 
145 Yang Faren ed., op.cit., p.159. 
146 Ibid, p.148. 
147 Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, op.cit., p.152. 
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provides a typical example. According to official documents, ‘The leaders and the 
core members of the Baren insurgence had gone to private Koran schools in Yecheng, 
Kashi, or Kujia and accepted the Pan-Islamic ideology. The head of the Baren 
insurgence had attended the private Koran school in Yecheng and was an imam. 
There were more than 220 Islamic clergies in Baren village, 80 of whom participated 
in the insurgence.’148 The Chinese media also claimed that young men involved were 
members of an ‘Islamic Holy War Force’ financed by local Muslims.149 
Furthermore, the state rebuilding has encouraged the international trade and 
granted more autonomy to the international trade companies. The state decided to re-
open China’s western border to trade in the post-Mao era.150  The reform on the 
international trade system of Xinjiang has experienced three major phases.151 The 
period from 1978 to 1987 was the probing phase, in which the state began to give 
                                                 
148 Yang Faren ed., op.cit., p.149. 
149 Joanne Smith, op.cit., p.197. 
150 In 1987, the state defined that places with right conditions in frontier minority areas should be 
selected to learn the international experiences of setting up inland development zones and frontier free 
trade zones, to speed up the opening there. To enliven economy in frontier areas, bring prosperity to 
frontier residents and promote economic and trade cooperation with adjacent countries, the state 
decided, in 1992, to further open a number of inland border cities with large minority populations, 
including Manzhouli and Erlianhot of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, Hunchun of Jilin 
Province, Yining, Bole and Tacheng of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, and Pingxiang and 
Dongxing of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. In 1993, the state selected seven ethnic 
localities--Hulun Buir League, Wuhai City, Yanbian Korea Autonomous Prefecture, Southeast 
Guizhou Miao-Dong Autonomous Prefecture, Linxia Hui Autonomous Prefecture, Golmud City, and 
Ili Kazak Autonomous Prefecture, as areas for pilot projects for reform and opening-up. 
151 Wang Shuanqian ed., Xinjiang Moving toward the 21 Century: Economy Volume (Xinjiang 
People’s Press, 1999), p.157. 
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more autonomy to the international trade companies and gave guiding instructions 
rather than compulsory plans. Then 1988 to 1990 was the developing phase, in which 
the system of contracted responsibility was employed in the system of international 
trade. Finally, 1990 to now was the phase of further perfecting the reform on the 
system of international trade. Before 1978, there were only several state-owned 
enterprises that engaged in import and export activities. In 1997, there were more 
than 160 enterprises that were entitled the right of doing international trade and over 
400 enterprises that were allowed to handle small-amount frontier trade.152 The state’s 
revitalization of the border trade of Xinjiang not only links China to Central Asian oil 
or mineral industries and European Markets, but also re-establishes cultural ties 
between Uyghurs and Central Asian, Turkic, and Middle Eastern centers. 153 
Following the opening of Xinjiang’s borders, news from the outside world has 
flooded into the region via domestic and international media and Uyghurs have been 
increasingly exposed to knowledge of world events.154 One interviewee admitted that 
he listened to radio broadcasts in Uyghur coming out of Kazakhstan, which informed 
him that Xinjiang was receiving money and guns from other Muslim countries to help 
their independence movement. With the opening up of Xinjiang, foreign forces could 
                                                 
152 Wang Shuanqian ed., op.cit.(Economic Volume), p.158. 
153 Scott Fogden, op.cit., p.37. 
154 Joanne Smith, op.cit., p.208. 
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more easily enter this region. So do the international allies of the East Turkestan 
Independence Movement. From Table 4.3, we can see that some East Turkestan 
SMOs have close connection with neighboring Central Asia states. It has also been 
reported recently that some of these SMOs have links with nebulous groups operating 
in the Middle East and Central Asia such as al-Qaeda, the Taliban, Hizb-ut-Tahrir 
(Islamic Revival), and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.155  
4.3 Conclusion 
As a process filled with interactions among various social forces, the 
evolutionary reform paradoxically led to the rise of ethnic collective protests. We 
must acknowledge the concerted efforts made by the state to achieve equality among 
groups. However, these efforts have been largely offset by the mechanism of market 
economy. The interest-oriented people began to reflect on the economic differences 
and the rising competition. Uyghurs’ perceptions of socio-economic inequalities are 
characterized by anger, bitterness, passion, and a strong sense of injustice.156  These 
feelings, combined with the awareness of religio-cultural differences have 
strengthened Uyghurs’ ethnic identity, which serves to heighten their common 
grievances and seceding intentions. The fast development of economy brought about 
                                                 
155 Scott Fogden, op.cit., p.61. 
156 Joanne Smith, op.cit., p.201. 
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by the state rebuilding has further provided sufficient amounts of resources for 
collective actions, while the change in the system of ownership has granted people the 
freedom to deal with their private belongings. Besides, social movement 
organizations have found growth space in the more tolerant environment and outside 
allies could be reached with the border opening policy. Thus, state rebuilding has led 
to an unanticipated outcome—rising ethnic insurgencies. 
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Chapter 5  Conclusion 
Xinjiang, being a remote multi-ethnic frontier area, has been increasingly beset 
by confrontation between two very distinct peoples—the more recently arrived Han 
Chinese and the indigenous Uyghurs. While the former group claims that Xinjiang 
has always been a part of China’s national territory, the latter has long engaged in 
opposition activities, namely the East-Turkestan Independence Movement. This paper 
has examined the development of the East-Turkestan Independence Movement in 
XUAR of P.R. China. My analysis demonstrates the value of using a ‘political 
opportunity’ framework to understand the oscillations in the contentious ethnic 
movement.  
Viewing state building as a continuous process of interactions of various social 
forces, the paper explores the dynamics between state building and social movement, 
arguing that the changing political opportunity environment brought about by state 
rebuilding in the post-Mao’s era has contributed to the emergence and development 
of the East Turkestan Independence Movement. To outline the causal mechanism 
between the two factors, the paper has not only explored their respective changes--the 
development pattern of the East Turkestan Independence Movement and the 
transformation in state rebuilding from a formal control system to a partial informal 
one--but also showed the causal flow, namely, how the social changes brought about 
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by state rebuilding has altered the interests of contending groups, supplying them 
with common grievances and amplifying their bases of solidarity and tactical power.  
The main hypothesis of this study is that state rebuilding has been an important 
factor in triggering and fueling the re-emergence of East Turkestan social movement. 
The historical account in Chapter 2 has shown that, in the Mao’s era from 1950s to 
1970s, the fierce defiance of the Uyghurs mellowed considerably and even 
disappeared. The active East Turkestan Independence Movement following the 
founding of the PRC was soon brought under the control of the People’s Liberation 
Army. The insurgencies were heavily repressed, and mass Han Chinese were 
transferred into Xinjiang to empower the XPCC and strength its control of this region. 
At the same time, the CCP began to set up the command economy system and its 
corresponding political and social systems. With the collectivization of rural and 
urban economy and the establishment of a bulky set of administrative organs, an 
overwhelming formal control system was created. The command economy system 
and the coherent institutional arrangement in political and social areas imposed 
draconian constraints on the behaviors and activities of the people: the government 
assigned jobs to citizens, stipulated the salary for them, decided food quota, restricted 
population movement and other social activities, gave instructions to enterprises, 
determined the output and input of production, and so on. In essence, people did not 
have their private sphere and personal freedom.  
  124
This oppressing and stifling political atmosphere had a detrimental effect on the 
East Turkestan Independence Movement. Although Mao’s era of governing China 
could be described as a tumultuous period with constant campaigns and “class 
struggles”, it was a relatively peaceful episode in terms of “ethnic unrest”. The 
volatile situation in 1950s was soon replaced by tranquility in the ensuing two 
decades. In 1960s, there were only three major insurgences documented in the official 
records. The most influential one, the case of the ETPRP, was an abortive attempt. 
The Ili disturbance in 1962 was largely caused by the exodus of 60,000 Uyghurs and 
Kazakhs across the border into the USSR, indicating that these people would rather 
choose evasion than confrontation. In 1970s, the East Turkestan Independence 
Movement showed a striking silence. 
However, the violent protest re-surfaced and developed rapidly following the 
reform policy in the later 1970s. When the formal control system encountered 
enormous problems, Deng’s reform began to make great efforts to de-mobilize 
society through re-employing the market economy mechanism. By using the 
economy information leverage to adjust the production activities and commercial 
trade, the state refrained from direct political involvement in the economic sphere. 
The state tried to utilize economic incentives instead of mandatory instructions to 
regulate the movement of the people. Though the CCP remained dominant in the 
political field and the central government retained paramount power, the state did 
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adopt more open and tolerant social policies toward the citizens, allowing more 
private space and delegating more decision-making powers to the people.  
This changed political milieu had a favorable effect on the East Turkestan 
movement. As could be seen from the records, the re-surfacing and escalation of the 
East Turkestan Independence Movement coincided with the loosening-up of the 
control process. In the early 1980s, some sporadic Uyghur insurgences emerged. 
These disturbances soon spread throughout XUAR, and the level of violence arising 
from the conflicts escalated, especially during 1990s. The event of Baren Village was 
reported to be extremely bloody. In addition, some terrorism means were employed 
by the activists to demonstrate their solidarity with the burgeoning Islamic 
fundamentalist movements worldwide.   
Arguably, the state rebuilding in the post-Mao era was essentially a 
transformation from a formal control system to a partial informal one, one in which 
the authorities try to use economic leverage to integrate the minorities into China 
Proper. In this transformation, the previous dominant political power began to retreat 
from the economic sphere; market economy system regained the opportunity to 
flourish; private properties were allowed; the previous paramount position of Maoist 
ideology began to decline; the ethnic cultural and religious policies became more 
tolerable; and so on. In all, an interest-based social order was formed.  
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This policy shift has its rationale. Informal control, which relies on persuasive 
means rather than coercive one, is more effective and less money-consuming than 
formal control. By appealing to the instinct and self-interest of the citizens, the state 
utilizes a more subtle mechanism to lead and manage people. It is not necessary for 
the state to spend huge sums of money to deploy coercive forces. Besides, this 
interest-based social order also contributes to social stability and facilitates 
governance. The behavior of the interest-oriented citizens becomes more predictable 
and stable; hence there would be less turbulent changes in the society. Moreover, it 
has some special advantage in integrating the ethnic groups. The centrifugal force of 
ethno-nationalism has been demonstrated by many cases. The Chinese government 
adopted some policies to dilute the ethnic culture and discourage the alien religion in 
Mao’s era such as the changing of Uyghur’s language script and the religious reform. 
But these repressive policies did not achieve their goal. Even worse was that these 
policies were regarded as ’forced assimilation’ by the Uyghurs and aroused much 
discontent and anger. However, in the market economy system, minorities feel the 
necessity of learning mandarin and integrating into the entire national economy 
system. Hence, the “assimilation” takes another subtle form. 
However, state building is not an uncontested enterprise. The efforts made by 
the central government might not always produce the anticipated results, but rather, 
generate many side-effects that might be completely against the will of the state. The 
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state rebuilding from 1978 has conversely led to the surge of ethno-nationalism 
nationwide. Using the Uyghur people as a case, this study has carefully examined the 
favorable conditions brought about by state rebuilding to the East Turkestan 
Independence Movement. Along with Deng’s reform, the political milieu became 
more open and tolerant. Ethnic identity became more salient as the paramount 
position of the class identity declined and the competition accompanying the market 
economy increased.  So did the Uyghurs’ feeling of subordination and disparity. 
Hence, the feeling of belonging to a distinct and disadvantaged ethnic group might 
reinforce the Uyghurs’ unwillingness to be ruled by others and provide justification 
for their collective dissents. Moreover, with the loosening control in cultural area, 
Islam, which is one primary identity maker, became more influential in the Uyghurs’ 
self-identification. Furthermore, the availability of abundant resources resulting from 
the development of a market economy, grants the necessary conditions for raising and 
sustaining collective actions. In addition, the loosened social control eased the way of 
forming social movement organizations, and to some extent, facilitated the progress 
of mounting ethnic insurgences. Hence, the 1980s and 1990s witnessed the rapid 
development of East Turkestan Independence Movement in Xinjiang.  
As a part of state building, the contentious politics also helps to remake the 
state. The anxiety of the Chinese authorities over this region increased with the level 
of violence of the Uyghurs. As a result of these increased protests, in April 1996 the 
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Chinese government launched a series of new crackdowns and a ‘Strike Hard’ (Yan 
Da) campaign to reestablish order in Xinjiang. 157 Hence, after a period of greater 
tolerant policy during the 1980s and the early 1990s, the state has since the mid-
1990s reverted to the strictest controls and outright repression. Many talibs, students 
of Islam, were arrested and sent out of the region to prison camps in Qinghai.158 
Schools and colleges in Xinjiang were identified as potential hotbeds of separatist and 
illegal religious activities and became the main target of the Chinese authorities in 
June 1996. Many illegal mosques and religious schools were closed down and police 
confiscated reactionary books and publications promoting national separation, as well 
as some illegal religious publicity materials.159 Abdulahat Abdurixit, Chairman of the 
XUAR government made the following speech on August 13th on the struggle against 
separatism: ‘we sternly cracked down on violent terrorist acts and separatist and 
sabotaging activities carried out by an extremely small number of ethnic separatists. 
In light of actual conditions, localities and departments formulated specific 
implementation measures and plans; provided specific regulation on managing 
religious venues, clergy personnel, the content of scriptural teaching, and the talifu 
                                                 
157 A systematic crackdown on crime throughout the whole of China was launched at the end of April 
1996. In Chinese, it is called ‘Yan Da’, an abbreviation of yanli daji yanzhong xingshi fanzui huodong 
(campaign to strike severely at serious criminal offences). In addition to this crackdown on crime in 
general, the campaign was also clearly directed against the particular separatist activists in Tibet, Inner 
Mongolia and Xinjiang. 
158 Michael Dillon, op.cit., p. 87. 
159 Ibid, p. 88. 
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(students). They put forward regulatory requirements and improvement suggestions 
on ethnic customs and habits and religious ceremonies and activities. They 
investigated illegal religious activities, cleaned up and outlawed underground 
scriptures schools, scripture-teaching venues and martial arts halls and carried out 
supervision, monitoring and education of ideologically reactionary talifu. This has 
dealt a firm blow to illegal religious activities…’160 In all, Beijing’s policy turned 
from accommodation to repression although it did not return to the formal control 
model in the Mao era. This reciprocal relationship between state policy and social 
movement forms the impetus of the on-going process of state building. But this 
relationship cannot be regarded simply as formal control leading to low frequency of 
collective action, while informal control causes high frequency of collective action. 
As we can see from the records, although the Chinese authorities re-adopted the 
repressive policy, the volatile situation in Xinjiang did not come under control 
immediately. The turbulence in 1997 has well demonstrated this. Far from calming 
down, the Uyghur activists plotted several collective actions to show their 
perseverance. The big march that happened on Feb. 5th 1997 involved nearly one 
thousand Muslims and ended up in anti-Han bloodshed and the looting of shops. It 
was the most serious political turmoil since 1962. 
                                                 
160 Ibid, p. 92. 
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The once again stern state policy has significantly influenced the East 
Turkestan Independence Movement, though it has not completely eliminated the 
movement. This repressive policy has greatly curtailed the growth space for the East 
Turkestan Independence Movement and subsequently pushed the activists to resort 
more to some extremist behaviors such as assassination and bombing. Other than an 
increase in number, the targets of the assassination attempts has broadened. 
Previously, the activists’ targets of assassination were confined to only Han Chinese 
cadres, police and military. As a result of the repressive control, activists also turned 
their anger on Uyghur cadres, who they viewed as ‘collaborators’ with Han Chinese. 
According to the official report, in early May 1996, a gang of eleven Uyghur 
separatists attacked the rural home of a local Uyghur leader in Kucha. They threw 
grenades through the windows, then cut out the tongues and sliced the throats of the 
leader, his wife, his younger brother, and his brother’s life.’ 161  Another serious 
incident was an attack in Kashghar on May 12th on a senior imam of the ID Gah 
Mosque in the city who was also the Vice-Chairman of the Xinjiang Chinese People’s 
Consultative Committee and a member of the Standing Committee of the state-
sponsored China Islamic Association. The attack on Mullah Aronghan Haji left him 
injured and hospitalized. The imam stood accused of having links with the Chinese 
                                                 
161 Joanne Smith, op. cit., p. 198. 
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government that were ‘too close’.162  Bombing, the other major extremist means, 
became more frequent from the mid-1990s. The bombing of buses in Urumqi on 
February 25th 1997 happened on the sixth and the last day of official mourning for 
Deng Xiaoping who died on February 19th.  The bombs exploded on bus routes 2, 10 
and 44 in the city and resulted in seven deaths and over seventy injured,163 some of 
whom are Uyghurs. ‘Representatives of Uyghur nationalist and Islamist groups at a 
press conference in Moscow the previous day had confirmed that some separatist 
groups had decided that a terror campaign was the only way they would be able to 
create an Islamic state in the region.’164 These extremist means have even aroused the 
discontent of many Uyghur common persons, especially those elderly generation and 
middle-aged Uyghurs who are grateful for recent improvements in standards of living 
and regard the peace as the supreme. When speaking of the bombings and 
assassinations, most of my interviewees showed their disagreement and even disgust. 
One interviewee said, “I do not think that they are fighting for our nation. Look at the 
facts. Those who bore the brunt of the radicals’ attack were not only Han Chinese but 
also members of our people. Their brutal actions only convince me that they are 
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virtually pursuing their own interests without truly caring for our people.”165 Another 
interviewee recalled the period after the bombing of 1997 in Urumqi, “For quite a 
long time, we dare not take buses to school. Since we do not have our own vehicle, I 
had to walk to school every weekday. Moreover, we cancelled all excursion plans in 
case we run into some terrorist actions.”166 Although the extremist means have, to 
some extent, surprised the Beijing government, they are not powerful enough to force 
concessions of the state. Even worse, sticking to the terror road, the Uyghur activists 
might loose these potential supporters.  
To forecast the prospect of the East Turkestan Independence Movement, we 
should take into consideration some other points. First is the changing international 
environment. On the one place, the Chinese government has actively been seeking 
international cooperation to keep Xinjiang within China. A major initiative in this 
regard is the formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). In April 
1996, the presidents of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan held a 
meeting in Shanghai to discuss mutual problems and opportunities. Fundamentalist 
Islamic terrorism inevitably became an important theme in their thinking. Meetings of 
the presidents of these five countries were held every year and in June 2001, the five 
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were joined by the president of Uzbekistan to form the SCO.167 One of the aims of 
this organization was to counter Islamic fundamentalist terrorism. On the other hand, 
the fundamental changes in the international environment wrought by the September 
11th 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States have favored China. ‘For better or 
worse, this event transformed the way the international community views many 
separatist movements, particularly when they involve Muslim populations. Whether 
in Palestine, Kashmir, the Philippines, Chechnya, or elsewhere, separatist movements 
have been branded as terrorist. Where formerly the talk may have been of 
‘decolonization’ or, in the old Marxist terminology, ‘wars for national liberation’, 
now these struggles are all conveniently subsumed under the rubric of terrorism by 
the concerned states. The claims of existing states against dissident minorities have 
been strengthened and are likely to remain so for the foreseeable future.’ Some 
analysts have suggested that the U.S., which has been actively engaged in efforts to 
improve human rights conditions in the world, has changed since the events of 
September 11, 2001. They point out that China might be seeking concessions from 
the U.S. regarding Xinjiang in exchange for China’s cooperation in the global 
campaign against terrorism. 
                                                 
167 Collin Mackerras, ‘Ethnicity in China: The Case of 
Xinjiang’,http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~asiactr/haq/200401/0401a001.html (November 15, 2004). 
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The other point is the economic development and modernization in Xinjiang. 
Although the competition within Xinjiang might sharpen and Uyghurs’ grievances 
might deepen with the market economy, it is undeniable that the living standard of the 
Uyghurs has improved much in comparison with the past. Most Uyghurs do not want 
to ‘rock the boat’. Large numbers of Uyghurs are participating successfully in the 
burgeoning Chinese economy. Few of these Uyghurs are willing to involve directly in 
the more radical forms of resistance to Chinese rule. Although the collapse of the 
Soviet Union in 1991 and the establishment of independent states by the former 
Soviet Central Asian republics, had some negative effect by encouraging some 
Uyghurs to aspire to reestablish an independent homeland, it is partially offset by the 
fact that Xinjiang’s economy is developing far more rapidly than the economies of 
the neighboring independent Turkic states, with the exception of 
Kazakstan. ’Whereas a generation ago the relative prosperity of Soviet Central Asia 
left most of its inhabitants willing to seek some kind of accommodation with Moscow, 
a similar dynamic could work to Beijing’s benefit today.’168 An important point worth 
mentioning is the Great Western Development Strategy169 (Xibu Da Kaifa Zhanlüe) 
                                                 
168 Graham E. Fuller and S. Frederick Starr, op.cit.. 
169 The west includes provinces of Shanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang, Sichuan, Chongqing, 
Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet, Guangxi and Inner Mongalia.  
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launched since January 2000.170Although this policy is nothing new in terms of its 
aim of boosting economic development, the scale is unprecedentedly extensive. The 
government has invested substantially and set up quite a few mammoth projects 
covering infrastructure, communications, energy, ecology, and water management. 
The state is also promoting high-tech industries and attracting foreign direct 
investment into Xinjiang.  
By the time of my fieldwork in 2004, the Great Western Development Strategy 
has already produced some effects. The capital Urumqi now has modern highways, 
freeways, supermarket, shopping malls and high-rise apartment. Towns everywhere 
are being modernized with the rapid construction and renovation of the transportation 
system. Increasing wealth and rising standard of living are creating the conditions for 
a burgeoning middle class in Xinjiang. This means that there is an emerging Uyghur 
middle class whose members have better jobs, are more prosperous than the elder 
generations, and are accessing better education. They might continue to feel very 
strongly about their Uyghur identity, but may not be quite as ready to take up arms 
for a secessionist movement.171 
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Judging from the present situation, the Uyghur problem will not go away in a 
short time because of the cultural and historical roots. The East Turkestan 
Independence Movement is even likely to exacerbate and the conflicts might escalate 
as political, cultural, economic and international factors intensify the social pressures 
within Xinjiang. The activists would mount more extremist behaviors when faced 
with the suppression of the Chinese state. 
Given the power of the Chinese state, however, Beijing will be able to contain 
this region in the foreseeable future, barring unforeseen circumstances. With the 
increasing immigration of Han Chinese and the development of the regional economy, 
the Uyghur language, identity, and culture might eventually dissolve in the interests 
of broader amalgamation into the dominant Han culture.  
In contrast to the immense influence that ethno-nationalism has exerted on 
China, current studies about it are still conspicuously meager. This paper is an 
attempt to study ethno-nationalism from the perspective of the interaction between 
the state building and social movement. It has proposed a theory about the effects of 
the state’s control policy on the development of contentious ethnic movement. 
Whether this theory is applicable to other similar cases such as Tibet and Inner 
Mongolia requires further research.  
Since the ethnic issue remains a sensitive topic in China, most studies on it are 
qualitative and descriptive. However, if China keeps its informal control strategy and 
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continues to open up China, quantitative study could come to play a greater role as 
valuable data would be more accessible. How the state policies influence the social 
movement and how the social movement helps to re-build the state could be further 
studied at the micro level. In addition, the availability of quantitative data also will 
enhance the study on ethno-nationalism through reification. What are the components 
of ethno-nationalism? Is it universal or diverse in different cases? Could the feeling of 
belonging to a certain ethnic group be measured? How strong can a particular ethnic 
identity be? And will the attachment to a certain group change as time goes by? These 
questions could be explored in the further study. 
The study on the Uyghur people could also be subdivided. The resistance group 
is not a unified entity; on the contrary, it consists of conflicting sectors. According to 
the means adopted, there are two primary sectors in the resistance group: autonomists 
and separatists. Autonomists are strongly committed to the preservation of the 
Uyghur’s identity, culture and traditions, yet they believe that these goals can be 
achieved only if Beijing grants to Xinjiang a meaningful degree of political 
autonomy. 172  Separatists seek the same ends but deem these can be realistically 
achieved only through full political separation from the People’s Republic of 
                                                 
172 Graham E. Fuller and S. Frederick Starr, op.cit  p. 22. 
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China.173 Among the separatists there are sharp division between those dedicated to 
peaceful means and those advocating political violence. Further study could look 
inside the Uyghur group: How to draw the line between different sectors? What 
causes them to choose different means? Do the members of one sector shift to the 
other sector? If the answer is yes, then under what conditions does the conversion 
take place? These questions are not only academically meaningful, but also politically 
significant. Beijing has long believed that outside forces have caused ethnic unrest in 
Xinjiang174 and is determined to put down all political and social unrest through 
coercive and repressive campaigns if necessary. Although no one doubts Beijing’s 
capability to keep Xinjiang within China’s border, yet for China’s long term stability 
and security, the central government needs to look into the actual situation and try to 
avoid ill-devised plans. 
                                                 
173 Ibid, p. 23. 
174 The Document No. 7, issued on 19 March 1996 by the Party Central Committee in Beijing, 
explicitly claimed that “the separatist organizations abroad have reinforced their collaboration, 
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Appendix I 
Map of Xinjiang 
 
Area: 1.6 million sq. km. 
Capital: Urumchi (Urumqi) 
Major cities: Kashgar, Khotan, Yarkend, Aksu, Kuchar, Korla, Turpan, Chochek.  
Major mountains: Altay (north), Tangri Tagh (centrer), Karakorum, Altun, Kunlun 
(south) 
Highest peak: Chogori (8,611 m) 
Lowest altitude: Turpan depression (155 m below sea level) 
Major lakes: Lopnor, Sayram, Boghda, Baghrash. 
Major rivers: Tarim (2,137 km), Ili, Irtish, 
Deserts: Taklimakan (Tarim basin), Gurbantunggut (Junggar basin), Gumtay (east) 
Source: <http://www.ccs.uky.edu/~rakhim/doc_files/map.html >(November 11, 2004) 
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Appendix II 
Xinjiang’s GDP Growth 
Xinjiang China 
Year GDP per capital 
(yuan) 
GDP per capital 
(yuan) 
1978 313 378 
1980 410 461 
1985 820 846 
1986 924 953 
1987 1053 1088 
1988 1347 1345 
1989 1493 1496 
1990 1799 1627 
1991 2101 1864 
1992 2477 2277 
1993 3019 2923 
1994 3953 3892 
1995 4764 4815 
1996 5167 5634 
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook 1997, (China Statistical Publishing House, 
Beijing, 1997); Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook 1997, (China Statistical 
Publishing House, Beijing, 1997). 
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Appendix IV 
Uyghur Organizations Around the World 
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Source: East Turkestan Information Center 
<http://www.uygur.org/adres/uygur_organization.htm> (November 11, 2004) 
 
 
